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INTRODUCTION 
In its 1950 Feres v. United States1 opinion, the Supreme Court 
considered three companion Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA” or 
“the Act”)2 cases involving claims of military members arising from 
injuries that occurred while they were on active duty.3  The Court 
concluded that Congress had not intended to include such claims in 
the Act’s general waiver of sovereign immunity.4  Accordingly, it held 
                                                      
 1. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 2. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing an administrative procedure for tort 
claims against federal agencies and granting United States district courts jurisdiction 
to hear such claims, subject to specific exceptions and jurisdictional exclusions). 
 3. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949); Griggs v. United 
States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 
1949). 
 4. The Feres opinion concludes, “We do not think that Congress, in drafting this 
Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected 
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that, “the Government is not liable under the . . . Act for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service.”5  In practice, this means that members of 
the military cannot sue the government in tort for injuries related to 
their military service. 
Judges, bar associations, attorneys, and academics have severely 
criticized the Feres decision.  The Court is accused of willfully ignoring 
a straight-forward statute6 by creating an exception to the FTCA that 
Congress deliberately rejected.7  It is charged that Feres “and its 
progeny have wrought untold injustice.”8  In sum, according to this 
school of thought, “[g]iven the absence of historical or legal support, 
the Feres doctrine appears to be the product of little more than 
judicial lawmaking.”9 
The burden of this Article is to show that the Supreme Court 
correctly decided the Feres case in 1950.  Part I reviews the historical 
and legal backdrop to Feres.  It discusses the considerations and 
decades-long legislative efforts that led to the enactment of the 
FTCA.  It then evaluates the four mechanisms through which service 
members sought financial relief for service-connected injuries prior 
to enactment of the FTCA.  The uniform compensation system 
Congress established for service members and veterans provided 
substantial benefits.  Tort litigation under pre-FTCA statutes that 
waived sovereign immunity, however, was unsuccessful because those 
statutes were held to exclude claims of service members who had a 
Congressionally-provided administrative remedy.  The Military Claims 
                                                      
injuries or death due to negligence.  We cannot impute to Congress such a radical 
departure from established law in the absence of express congressional command.”  
340 U.S. at 146. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he only conceivable reason for the Court to engage in re-writing 
of such a momentous statute was that it believed that Congress had not given enough 
protection to the government against the men and women in the armed forces.”). 
 7. See, e.g., ABA & BAR ASS’N OF D.C., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 12 
(2008) (“The Court—almost 60 years ago—wrote into the FTCA an additional 
exception that Congress could have added but deliberately did not.”).  The 
American Bar Association approved Recommendation 10(b), which urged “Congress 
to examine the ‘incident to service’ exception to the [FTCA] created by the Supreme 
Court in Feres . . . [and] provide that only the exceptions specifically provided in the 
Act limit active duty military members’ access to the courts.”  2008 ANNUAL MEETING 




 8. Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty:  The Cox 
Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 57, 119–20 (2002). 
 9. Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris:  The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign 
Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
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Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act authorized and paid 
administrative settlements to service members for various tort claims, 
but not for “injury or death occur[ring] incident to their service.”10  
Congressionally-enacted private laws for the benefit of individual 
injured service members did not produce compensation because few 
such bills were passed by Congress, and those that did were vetoed.   
Part II analyzes the key, pre-Feres judicial opinions that addressed 
whether service members could sue under the FTCA.  It examines 
two seminal opinions by U.S. District Judge William Chesnut, the first 
rejecting the government’s argument that the FTCA did not apply to 
suits arising from military service and the second granting dismissal 
on that basis.  It analyzes the district court and Fourth Circuit 
opinions in the Brooks litigation, and the parties’ briefing of that case 
before the Supreme Court.  It reviews the Court’s 1949 Brooks 
decision which held that service members could sue under the FTCA 
for injuries not incurred incident-to-service.11  Finally, it summarizes 
the three circuit court opinions12 that raised the common issue the 
Court resolved in Feres:  whether the FTCA provides a remedy for 
injuries arising incident to military service.13  
Part III reviews the Supreme Court proceedings in Feres.   
It examines the government’s Supreme Court briefs and those of the 
three plaintiffs.  It summarizes the Court’s Feres decision.  To provide 
a background for considering the criticisms of the decision that 
ensued, it briefly reviews the Court’s subsequent, related opinions.  
Part IV considers the Feres opinion and the criticisms leveled 
against it.  It evaluates the Feres opinion and the reasoning supporting 
the Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to 
apply to injuries that arose incident to military service.  It examines 
criticisms that directly challenge Feres’ reasoning, including 
arguments that the FTCA does not require parallel private person 
liability, that state tort law can properly be used in service member 
suits despite the federal relationship between them and the 
government, and that the Court misjudged the importance of the 
military compensation system to the FTCA.  It also examines two 
criticisms that independently attack Feres’ holding.  The first argues 
that earlier drafts of the FTCA included an exception for claims of 
                                                      
 10. Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-67, 59 Stat. 225 (1946) 
(codified with some difference in language in 1946 at 31 U.S.C. § 223b, now codified 
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731–39 (2006)). 
 11. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50–51 (1949). 
 12. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir 1949); Griggs v. United 
States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 
1949). 
 13. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
2010] IN DEFENSE OF FERES 397 
service members that was not included in the Act; the second asserts 
that Feres undermines the deterrence aspect of tort law.  Finally, Part 
IV considers labels that have been pinned onto the Feres opinion—
that it judicially created an extra exception to the FTCA, that it 
usurped the role of Congress, and that it fostered injustice. 
The Article concludes with an appraisal of the logical 
consequences of the Feres holding.  These include the limited 
authority of the Feres decision outside its FTCA context, the 
importance of the rationales of the decision in deciding whether the 
FTCA or other areas of the law provide a financial remedy to service-
members, and whether the Feres holding can be altered by the 
judiciary. 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FERES DECISION 
A. Sovereign Immunity and Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it is understood in 
American jurisprudence, provides that a sovereign state can be sued 
only to the extent that it has consented to be sued and that only its 
legislative branch can give such consent.14  Unless Congress has 
enacted an applicable waiver of the United States’ sovereign 
immunity, the federal government cannot be sued for damages.15   
“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be 
unequivocally expressed in statutory text, . . . and will not be 
implied . . . .”16  Accordingly, no one could sue the United States in 
tort until Congress passed a statute waiving the government’s 
sovereign immunity for such a suit.17  The Federal Tort Claims Act 
                                                      
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (stating that the 
principle that power to consent is reserved to Congress is central to our 
understanding of sovereign immunity); accord United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (“Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a 
sovereign.  Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power is void. . . .  
Public policy forbids the suit unless consent is given, as clearly as public policy makes 
jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of the legislative body.”). 
 15. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (“Thus, except as Congress 
has consented to a cause of action against the United States, ‘there is no jurisdiction  
. . . in any . . . court to entertain suits against the United States.’” (quoting United 
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941))); United States v. McLemore,  
45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846) (“[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its 
own consent, given by law.”); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) 
(“The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted 
against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.”). 
 16. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., 
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 
(1990)); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 514. 
 17.  See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (stating that the ability to sue the United States 
relies upon statutory authority). 
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provided such a general waiver for tort cases when it became law in 
1946.18 
American citizens have a First Amendment right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.19  From the beginning of the 
Republic, individuals have used that right to seek special private 
legislation granting them financial remedies for damages caused by 
the government, including tort damages.20  Also from the beginning, 
members of Congress recognized that legislation was a poor way to 
resolve private claims against the government.  On February 23, 1832, 
John Quincy Adams wrote: 
There is a great defect in our institutions by the want of a court of 
Exchequer or Chamber of Accounts.  [Deciding claims] is judicial 
business, and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do 
with it.  One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by it, and 
there is no common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided.  
A deliberative assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the 
administration of justice.21 
By the twentieth century, the legislative process had proven 
particularly ill-suited to resolving tort claims.22  The process was 
subject to inordinate delays and arbitrary actions.23  Congressional 
                                                      
 18. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Paul Frederic Kirgis, Section 1500 and the 
Jurisdictional Pitfalls of Federal Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1997) 
(citing WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART 
II:  ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855–1978, at 9 (1978)). 
 20. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
77th Cong. 49–55 (1942) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463]; James 
E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:  Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 23 (forthcoming 
2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/pfander.paper.pdf 
 21. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 49.  On December 18, 
1854, Senator Broadhead of Pennsylvania similarly stated:   
[O]ne third of the [Senate’s] time, to say nothing of the time spent by 
committee—is set apart for the consideration  of private bills . . . .  Our time 
is too valuable to be occupied in discussing the merits or demerits of a 
private bill.  Frequently, we dispute about the facts of a case presented in an 
ex parte way, the truth of which could be better ascertained by a tribunal 
differently constituted. 
Id.   
 22. In 1926, the House of Representatives procedure for enacting such a private 
bill called for the claim to be referred to the Committee on Claims.  H.R. REP. NO. 
69-667, at 13 (1926) (Supplementary Report of Congressman Emanuel Celler), cited 
in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 50–51.  If the committee 
took favorable action, the claim would be forwarded to the House where it would be 
placed on the Private Calendar.  Id.  Any member could strike it from that calendar 
for any reason.  Id.  
 23. See id. (stating that the Committee on Claims could meet for a century and 
still not adjudicate all pending claims).  In 1926, Congressman Charles Underhill of 
Massachusetts said, “The power vested in the chairman of the Committee on Claims 
is tremendous and absolutely wrong.  I can either refuse arbitrarily to consider your 
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procedures were inadequate to the task of promptly and effectively 
resolving tort claims on their merits.  In 1926 Congressman Celler 
explained that the “Committee on Claims ha[d] no facilities nor 
ha[d] the members time or inclination to pass upon questions of 
negligence and contributory negligence, to sift evidence, and 
determine a host of matters.”24  Witnesses were not cross-examined.25  
The process imposed substantial burdens on the time and 
attention of Congress.26  Narrow waivers of sovereign immunity did 
become law, as then Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea 
explained in 1942 when he presented the Administration’s detailed 
recommendation for what became the Federal Tort Claims Act:  
[T]he ban upon suits against the Government [was] lifted in 
certain cases sounding in tort. . . .  During the [F]irst World War, 
when the Government took over operation of the railroads and 
other utilities, Congress made the United States subject to the same 
responsibility for property damage, personal injury, and death as 
the private owners themselves would have been.  A few years later, 
in 1920 and 1925, the Government consented to suits in the district 
courts upon admiralty and maritime torts involving Government 
vessels, without limitation as to amount.27 
These statutes did not significantly stanch the number of private 
bills.  In 1926, the House Committee on Claims favorably reported a 
general tort claims bill, largely because of the burden private claims 
imposed on Congress.28  The committee noted that in the previous 
Congress (the 68th), more than two thousand private bills were 
introduced, but only 250 were enacted.29  It explained that 
“[m]embership on the Committee on Claims ha[d] become a nearly 
                                                      
claim or I can take up each and every one of your claims to suit my convenience.”   
67 CONG. REC. 7527 (1926), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 
20, at 52. 
 24.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 14 (Supplementary Report of Congressman 
Emanuel Celler), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 51.  
Congressman Ross Collins of Mississippi testified that, “I made up my mind that 
Congress was wasting its time in playing around with these comparatively minor 
private bills, and that the consideration given to them by the individual membership 
was trifling.”  A General Tort Bill:  Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Claims,  
72d Cong. 6 (1932), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 53. 
 25. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 54 (statement of 
Congressman Robison). 
 26. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 49–55 
(collecting criticisms from various legislators that the private bill process is 
cumbersome, inefficient, and burdensome); S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946) 
(noting that thousands of private bills were introduced and hundreds were 
approved); H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945) (same).  
 27. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 24.   
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 1–2 (stating that the purpose of the bill is to ease 
the burden on Congress), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, 
at 50. 
 29. Id. 
400 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:393 
intolerable burden, not only because of the number of claims 
submitted but because of the realization that careful judicial 
consideration of the claims [wa]s for the most part impossible.”30 
In 1931, the House Committee on Claims issued a similar report 
on another tort claims bill, noting the continued “burden on 
Congress and the injustice to claimants, because of the lack of 
facilities for proper and adequate investigation of these claims.”31  
The situation was no better in 1940, when Congressman Celler 
explained that the committee could not know the details of each of 
the thousands of claims it considered in every Congress.32  In both the 
74th and 75th Congresses, over 2,300 private claim bills were 
introduced, seeking more than one hundred million dollars.33  In the 
77th Congress, there were 1,829 private claims bills, followed by 1,644 
in the 78th Congress.34 
Various legislative proposals for a broad tort claims act were 
debated for decades.35  In 1929, both houses of Congress passed such 
a bill, but President Coolidge pocket vetoed it, apparently because it 
would have authorized the Comptroller General (an agent of 
Congress) to represent the United States in the Court of Claims.36   
In the 76th Congress, the House passed H.R. 7263, a bill similar in 
many respects to the FTCA, but in 1940, “the pressure of other 
urgent matters prevented its consideration in the Senate before the 
close of the session.”37  On January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt sent 
a formal message to Congress urging the enactment of a tort claim 
act so that Congress and the Executive Branch could deal with larger 
matters and noting that in the previous three Congresses, fewer than 
twenty percent of the 6,300 private claim bills became law, and that 
private claims bills accounted for a third of the bills he had vetoed.38  
                                                      
 30. Id. 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 2 (1931), quoted in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and  
H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 52. 
 32. Debates on H.R. 7236, 86 CONG. REC. 12018 (1940), quoted in Hearings on  
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 54. 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 40–41 
(discussing the introduction of various legislative remedies in previous decades); 
LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS  
§§ 2.09–2.10 (2009).   
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 1 (1931), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 
6463, supra note 20, at 41 (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. Francis M. Shea).  “The 
Attorney General objected to the act because it placed the Comptroller General in 
charge of appeals to the Court of Claims from his own decisions, and the act received 
a pocket veto by President Coolidge.”  Id.; see also O.R. McGuire, Tort Claims Against 
the United States, 19 GEO. L.J. 133, 134–35 (1931) (discussing the history of President 
Coolidge’s pocket veto). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945). 
 38. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1 (1942).  The Roosevelt Administration, through 
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In the 77th Congress, the Senate passed S. 2221, a bill similar to the 
prior Congress’ H.R. 7263.39   
The legislative and administration proposals for a general tort 
claims act waiving sovereign immunity for government tort claims 
shared a common limitation—almost all of them had a cap on 
damages.  For example, the 1929 proposal passed by the 70th 
Congress had a limitation of $50,000 for property damages and 
$7,500 for personal injury or death claims.40  The 1940 House bill had 
a cap of $7,500 for all claims,41 as did President Roosevelt’s 1942 
proposal,42 and the House bill of 1942.43  The 1942 Senate-passed 
version capped damages at $10,000.44  In the 79th Congress, when 
passage of a statute was at hand, the House bill capped damages at 
$10,000 for “property loss or damage or personal injury or death.”45  
At the Senate’s insistence, the proposed damages cap was deleted 
from the statute.46   
Finally, the 79th Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as 
Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.47  On August 2, 
                                                      
the Department of Justice, was actively involved in drafting proposals for a general 
tort claims act.  See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 6–36 
(statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. Francis M. Shea); Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 15–31 (1940) (statement of 
Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen.); JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra 
note 35, § 2.10 (noting that Roosevelt’s Department of Justice collaborated with 
other governmental agencies to draft a federal tort bill).  
 39. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945); see also S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 6 (1942) 
(waiving sovereign immunity in part as did H.R. 7236).   
 40. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 41. 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4 (1940). 
 42. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 2 (1942).   
 43. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 2. 
 44. S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 2, 6.   
 45. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 4 (1945). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30 (1946).  The report stated: 
The essential difference is that the House bill puts a maximum limitation of 
$10,000 on claims for which suit may be brought, whereas this title as 
reported by your committee contains no such limitation.  The committee is 
of the opinion that in view of the banning of private claim bills in the 
Congress no such limitation should be imposed . . . . 
Id. 
 47. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  The Legislative 
Reorganization Act also established the organization of congressional committees, id. 
tits. I, II; regulated lobbying, id. tit. III; eliminated the need for congressional 
approval of each new bridge, id. tit. V; and altered congressional pay, id. tit. VI. 
Pertinent to the FTCA, Title I prohibited private bills in circumstances where the 
FTCA might provide a remedy: 
No private bill . . . directing (1) the payment of money for property damages, 
for personal injuries or death for which suit may be instituted under the 
[FTCA] . . . shall be received or considered in either the Senate or the 
House of Representatives. 
Id. § 131.  The Legislative Reorganization Act also generally repealed pre-FTCA laws 
that authorized federal agencies to pay compensation for the torts of federal 
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1946, President Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act, 
making the FTCA law.48  The President’s signing statement 
commended Congress for improving its efficiency, expanding the 
staff of Congressional committees and of agencies in the Legislative 
Branch, and raising Congressional salaries and expense allowances.49  
It did not mention the Federal Tort Claims Act.50 
The FTCA grants United States district courts specific, limited 
subject matter jurisdiction.51  This jurisdictional grant was intended to 
limit the waiver of sovereign immunity:  “The bill therefore does 
not . . . lift the immunity of the United States from tort actions except 
as jurisdiction is specifically conferred upon the district courts by this 
bill.”52  Thus, claims that would not lie against a private person under 
state law are not cognizable under the Act.53  The FTCA contained a 
number of explicit exceptions to its waiver of sovereign immunity,54 
including two that obviously would block some suits by injured service 
members.  The combatant activity exception bars “[a]ny claim arising 
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the 
Coast Guard, during time of war.”55  The foreign tort exception bars 
“[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.”56   
B. Financial Remedies of Service Members Prior to the  
Federal Tort Claims Act 
This Section addresses avenues that members of the military might 
have pursued to obtain financial relief for service-connected injuries 
incurred prior to the effective date of the FTCA.  It briefly reviews the 
uniform compensation systems available to service members and 
veterans.  It examines lawsuits brought by military personnel under 
                                                      
employees.  Id. § 424(a). 
 48. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675 (1946) (statement by President Truman upon signing 
the Legislative Reorganization Act).  President Truman’s statement is available 
through The American Presidency Project.  Statement by the President Upon 
Signing the Legislative Reorganization Act, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12480 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).  
 49. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Federal Torts Claim Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 812 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006)); The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, 
(recodifying Title 28 of United States Code).  Alterations in the language of the 
FTCA did not substantively alter the law.  Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 n.9 
(1950). 
 52. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 5 (1945). 
 53. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (recognizing the FTCA’s 
jurisdictional requirement of comparable private person liability under state law); 
infra notes 460–462 and accompanying text. 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006) (listing exceptions). 
 55. See id. § 2680(j). 
 56. See id. § 2680(k). 
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limited waivers of sovereign immunity enacted by Congress.   
It discusses the administrative remedies available under the Military 
Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act.  Finally, it reviews 
private relief legislation designed to provide extra benefits to 
particular injured service members beyond those available under 
established compensation systems, and President Truman’s and 
President Eisenhower’s vetoes of those few private bills passed by 
Congress.   
1. The Uniform Compensation Systems 
Congress has provided pensions for military veterans since the 
Revolutionary War.57  The World War Veterans’ Act of 1924 
consolidated laws that established benefits for World War I veterans 
and their dependents.58  In 1933, Congress gave the President, acting 
through the Veterans Administration, the authority to administer by 
regulation the benefits programs for the veterans of World War I and 
their dependents.59  From 1941 through 1946, Congress enacted a 
large number of statutes building on that system and considered 
many more.60   
At the time the FTCA became law, a wide range of remedies were 
available to service members, veterans, and their families.  Monthly 
pensions were provided for service members with partial or total 
                                                      
 57. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 84, 13 Stat. 499 (Civil War); Act of May 13, 
1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9, 10 (Mexican War); Act of April 24, 1816, ch. 68, 3 Stat. 296–97 
(War of 1812); Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (Revolutionary War); 
Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (Revolutionary War). 
 58. World War Veterans Act, 68 Pub. L. No. 242, 43 Stat. 607 (1924) (“An Act to 
consolidate, codify, revise, and reenact the laws affecting the establishment of the 
United States Veterans’ Bureau and the administration of the War Risk Insurance 
Act, as amended, and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, as amended.”). 
 59. Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, 48 Stat. 8.  The act also encompassed 
veterans of the Spanish American War, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Philippines 
Insurrection.  Id. § 1. 
 60. For example, from October 17, 1942 to June 30, 1943, Congress introduced 
2,366 general bills whose main purpose was to alter veterans’ benefits and enacted 
twenty-two into law.  1943 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 30–41.  In the period 
from July 1, 1945 to August 2, 1946, it considered 1,677 such bills and enacted fifty-
eight into law.  1946 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 49–61; see also Brief for the 
United States at 19, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (Nos. 388 and 389) 
[hereinafter U.S. Brooks Br.].  The United States argued: 
The most recent compilation of “Laws Relating to Veterans,” [compiled by 
Superintendent, Document Room, House of Representatives, 1948] sets 
forth the text of over 490 federal statutes enacted during 1914 to 1948.  
Current congressional concern for providing an adequate and specialized 
system of compensation for serviceman’s injury or death is also evidenced by 
the introduction during the fiscal year 1947, of approximately 2300 bills 
pertaining to veterans’ benefits, and by the introduction of almost 100 such 
bills during the first 10 days of the first session of the 81st Congress. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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disabilities.61  Pensions were provided for the widows, children, and 
dependent parents of service members who were injured or killed.62  
Service members who were incapacitated drew full military pay for 
their period of incapacitation.63  Service members injured while in 
service received free medical care.64  If a service member died in 
service, six months pay was paid to his or her beneficiary.65  
Subsidized life insurance was available to service members under the 
National Service Life Insurance Act.66  Unlike typical workers’ 
compensation statutes, benefits provided to service members and 
veterans compensated any injury, disability, or death that arose at any 
time during their period of service, not just those incurred while the 
service member was acting within the scope of employment or on 
active duty.67  Veterans were given hiring preferences in the civil 
service,68 housing benefits,69 and educational benefits.70 
Huge numbers of service members, veterans, and their families 
benefited from these programs in the 1940s.  On June 30, 1947, 
1,728,516 World War II veterans were receiving disability benefits.71  
On that date, death benefits were being paid to dependents of 
223,554 World War II veterans for service-connected deaths, and 
dependents of another 2,053 for non-service connected deaths.72  In 
the fiscal year of 1947, similar payments were made to World War I 
                                                      
 61. 38 U.S.C. § 701a (1946); Act of July 13, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-144, 57 Stat. 554; 
Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, § 1(a), 48 Stat. 8. 
 62. 38 U.S.C. § 701c (1946); § 1(c), 48 Stat. at 8. 
 63. See 10 U.S.C. § 847(a) (1946) (stating that incapacitation arising from alcohol 
or drug abuse, as opposed to injury, will not warrant payment); Act of June 16, 1942, 
Pub. L. No. 77-607, 56 Stat. 359, 364 (providing allowances for medically ill service 
members); Act of May 17, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-230, 44 Stat. 557 (stating that service 
members who are absent from their duties because of venereal disease are permitted 
allowances). 
 64. 38 U.S.C. § 434 (1946); § 6, 48 Stat. 8, 9; World War Veterans’ Act, Pub. L. 
No. 68-242, § 10, 43 Stat. 607, 610 (1924). 
 65. Act of December 17, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-99, 41 Stat. 367, amended by Act of 
December 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-198, 57 Stat. 599. 
 66. National Service Life Insurance Act, ch. 757, 54 Stat. 1008, 1009, 1012 
(1940). 
 67. Act of September 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-439, 58 Stat. 752.  The statute 
deemed any injury or disease to “have been incurred in line of duty” if the service 
member was “on active duty or on authorized leave” when the injury or disease arose.  
Id. § 2.  The only exceptions were injuries or disease that resulted from the service 
member’s “own willful misconduct,” or arose while the service member was 
deserting, absent without leave, or “confined under sentence of court martial or civil 
court.”  Id. 
 68. Act of June 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387, 388. 
 69. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 78-346, § 501, 58 Stat. 284, 292 
(1944) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 694(a) (1946)).  
 70. Id. § 400, 58 Stat. 284, 287–91 (1994), (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 739, Part VIII 
(1946)). 
 71. 1947 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 19. 
 72. Id. at 24, 25. 
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veterans’ dependents for 76,760 service-connected deaths and 
154,717 non-service connected deaths.73 
2. Tort litigation by military personnel under pre-FTCA  
waivers of sovereign immunity 
Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress passed other statutes 
that waived the government’s sovereign immunity for specific 
categories of torts.74  These included the Suits in Admiralty Act75 and 
the Public Vessels Act,76 which consented to suits involving admiralty 
and maritime torts of government vessels, and the Railroad Control 
Act of 1918,77 which consented to tort suits against the government 
for its operation of railroads and utilities under wartime authority.  
Despite language in these statutes that made the United States liable 
to the same extent as a private entity, the statutes were consistently 
interpreted to exclude claims made by members of the military for 
whom Congress had provided an administrative remedy.78 
Dobson v. United States,79 the leading authority on the issue, arose 
from the collision of the Steamship City of Rome and United States 
Submarine S-51, a public vessel.80  Suits were brought under the 
                                                      
 73. Id. at 26, 27. 
 74. See supra text accompanying note 27 (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Francis M. Shea) (explaining pre-FTCA waivers of sovereign immunity for suits in 
tort). 
 75. Act of March 9, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-156, § 2, 41 Stat. 525 (codified at  
46 U.S.C. § 30903 (2006)).  The statute provided:   
That in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if 
such cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty 
could be maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein 
provided for, a libel in personam may be brought against the United States . 
. . provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat . 
. . .   
Id. at 525–26. 
 76. Act of March 3, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-546, 43 Stat. 1112 (current version at  
46 U.S.C. § 31102 (2006)).  The statute provided, “[t]hat a libel in personam in 
admiralty may be brought against the United States, or a petition impleading the 
United States, for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.”  Id. at 
1112. 
 77. Act of March 21, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-107, § 10, 40 Stat. 451, 456.  The statute 
provided:  
That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and 
liabilities as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or 
at common law . . . . Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and 
against such carriers and judgments rendered as now provided by law; and in 
any action at law or suit in equity against the carrier, no defense shall be 
made thereto upon the ground that the carrier is an instrumentality or 
agency of the Federal Government.  
Id. 
 78. See infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have 
interpreted the statutes to exclude claims of service members).  
 79. 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 80. Haselden v. United States, 24 F.2d 529, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1927), aff’d sub nom. 
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Public Vessels Act by the estates of three submarine officers who died 
as a result of the collision.81  Following judgment for the United States 
in the district court, the Second Circuit confronted the issue whether 
the Public Vessels Act provided a remedy for the officers’ deaths 
under these circumstances.82  The court accepted that the language 
of the Public Vessels Act, read alone, might be broad enough to allow 
suit by officers and crew of a public vessel.83  Nevertheless, it ruled 
that no recovery could be had on behalf of the submarine officers 
from the United States, reasoning that the statute did not specify who 
might sue and that allowing such suits would be “so radical a 
departure from the government’s long-standing policy with respect to 
the personnel of its naval forces that we cannot believe the act should 
be given such a meaning.”84  The court recognized that the elaborate 
pension system provided to naval personnel was less generous than 
the recovery available under the Public Vessels Act.  The court found, 
however, that the statute’s general language was insufficiently specific 
to justify upsetting long-standing and well-known policy.  The court 
explained that “[t]he more natural meaning of the act is to refer it to 
damage caused by the ship to third persons who are not of her 
company, and generally, if not universally, the damage will be the 
result of a collision.”85 
The Second Circuit again addressed the issue of service member 
suits against the federal government in Bradey v. United States,86  
a Public Vessels Act suit alleging that a Navy fireman was killed in 
1944 when his destroyer was negligently struck by another vessel 
owned by the United States.87  The circuit court affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal.88  Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, 
explained: 
It is quite true that nothing in the text of the Public Vessels Act 
bars suit by a member of the armed forces, but in Dobson . . . we 
held that, because of the compensation elsewhere provided for 
                                                      
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 808. 
 83. Id.   
 84. Id. at 808–09; see also O’Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 869, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 
1925) (“Congress by this enactment [of the Public Vessels Act] clearly did not intend 
to overturn the government’s established policy, and permit its employees to bring 
actions for damages received on government ships in the course of their 
employment . . . .”), aff’d per curiam, 11 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 85. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809.  The court also addressed statutes that provided 
administrative compensation for lost property of officers and sailors.  Id.  
 86. 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 87. Id. at 742. 
 88. Id. at 743. 
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such persons, they must be deemed excluded from its protection. 
That case directly rules here . . . .89 
A similar line of authority holds that the government’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the Railroad Control Act did not open the 
United States to suit by service members.90  In Moon v. Hines,91 a 
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps soldier was injured while traveling 
by rail under military orders on September 30, 1918, and brought a 
tort action against the Director General of Railroads.92  The Supreme 
Court of Alabama concluded that the soldier’s administrative 
compensation provided under the War Risk Insurance Act93 was 
exclusive, barring his suit in tort.94  The court reasoned that Congress 
had not authorized such a suit against the government arising from 
its transportation of a service member.95  It explained that the 
soldier’s enlistment was a contract that changed his relationship with 
the government, giving him a new status with different rights and 
duties.96 
In Seidel v. Director General of Railroads,97 a World War I sailor walking 
down the street to his ship lost an eye when a railroad guard’s 
shotgun accidentally fired.98  The Supreme Court of Louisiana held 
that the sailor’s war risk insurance barred his suit in tort:  “If plaintiff 
had this remedy by suit in damages he would have against the 
government two remedies:  One in damages; and one under said act.  
The government has not so provided; but has provided only the one 
remedy under said act.”99 
In Sandoval v. Davis,100 the district court dismissed three 
consolidated actions of enlisted men who were allegedly injured or 
killed while in the line of duty by negligent operations of railroads 
under federal control.101  Each family had accepted compensation 
under the war risk insurance program.102  The court concluded that a 
suit in tort was barred “because of the compensation provisions of the 
                                                      
 89. Id.  
 90. See Moon v. Hines, 87 So. 603, 607 (Ala. 1921).  
 91. 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921). 
 92. Id. at 603–04. 
 93. The 1917 amendments to the War Risk Insurance Act provided benefits for 
the death or disability of all enlisted personnel and officers in the United States 
military.  See Act of October 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 300, 40 Stat. 398, 405.    
 94. Moon, 87 So. at 607. 
 95. Id. at 607–08. 
 96. Id. at 608. 
 97. 89 So. 308 (La. 1921). 
 98. Id. at 308.  
 99. Id. at 309. 
 100. 278 F. 968 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff’d per curiam, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923). 
 101. Id. at 969–70, 974–75. 
 102. Id. at 970. 
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War Risk Insurance Act.”103  The Sandoval opinion spoke to its 
similarity to the Moon and Seidel decisions:  
The conclusion in these three cases is the same.  The three 
different courts reached this conclusion by somewhat different 
argument.  It seems to me that the reasoning of all three opinions 
is sound.  Congress did not intend to confer upon an injured or 
killed soldier or sailor a right to a double recovery of compensation 
from the United States. . . .  The general creation and preservation 
of rights of action by section 10, Federal Control Act, and section 
206, Transportation Act of 1920, must yield to the specific 
provisions covering the injuries of a soldier or sailor on active 
service in the line of his duty.  The rights and remedies of a soldier 
or sailor in that situation are specially provided for and limited by 
the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act.104 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, per curiam.105   
3. The Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act 
In 1943, Congress enacted the Military Claims Act to consolidate a 
number of statutes that previously authorized the War Department to 
settle tort claims administratively.106  The procedures, scope, and 
limitations of those statutes varied greatly.107  The Military Claims Act 
was intended to “make possible the investigation, settlement, and 
payment in a uniform manner of all small claims; i.e. those not in 
excess of $500, or in time of war not in excess of $1,000, within the 
War Department.”108  The act did not authorize lawsuits, but 
established an administrative remedy 
                                                      
 103. Id. at 972.   
 104. Id. at 974–75. 
 105. Sandoval, 288 F. at 56–57 (citing Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421 (1922)) 
(holding that the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act was an exclusive remedy, 
barring suit under the Railroad Control Act). 
 106. Act of July 3, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 57 Stat. 372 (codified with some 
difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§§ 2731-39 (2006)). The consolidated statutes included:  Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. 
L. No. 62-338, 37 Stat. 569, 586, that authorized settlements of claims of up to $1,000 
“occasioned by heavy gun fire and target practice of troops, and for damages to 
vessels, wharves, and other private property, found to be due to maneuvers or other 
military operations for which the Government is responsible,” id.; Act of March 3, 
1885, ch. 335, 23 Stat. 350, as amended by Act of July 9, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-193,  
40 Stat. 845, 880, and by Act of March 4, 1921, Pub. L. No. 66-391, 41 Stat. 1436, 
allowing settlement of claims by military personnel for loss of personal property, id.; 
Act of December 28, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-375, 42 Stat. 1066, that authorized “the 
head of each department . . . to . . . adjust . . . any claim . . . on account of damages to 
or loss of privately owned property where the amount of the claim does not exceed 
$1,000, caused by the negligence of any officer or employee of the Government 
acting within the scope of his employment.”  Id. § 2.  See generally Martha L. Neese & 
Thomas J. Lyons, The Military Claims Act:  Remedy or Run Around?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 305, 307–09 (1990). 
 107. S. REP. NO. 78-243, at 3 (1943). 
 108. Id. at 2. 
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for damage to or loss or destruction of property, real or personal, 
or for personal injury or death, caused by military personnel or 
civilian employees of the War Department or of the Army while 
acting within the scope of their employment, or otherwise incident 
to noncombat activities of the War Department or of the 
Army . . . .109 
The Secretary of War or his designee could settle such claims 
outright or, if they exceeded $1,000, report them to Congress “for its 
consideration.”110  The statute did not require the claimant to make a 
showing of negligence or wrongful act.111  The Military Claims Act 
remedy was not available if the damage or injury was “caused in whole 
or in part by any negligence or wrongful act on the part of the 
claimant, his agent, or employee,” or if a written claim was not 
presented within one year.112  Nor did it apply “to claims for damage 
to or loss or destruction of property . . . or for personal injury or 
death of [military personnel or civilian employees of the War 
Department or of the Army] if such . . .  injury, or death occur[red] 
incident to their service.”113 
The Military Claims Act was deemed inadequate because it 
compensated some claims of military personnel but arbitrarily 
excluded similar claims that did not fall within the precise language 
of the statutes that had been consolidated in the Act.114  The Secretary 
of War recommended clarifying legislation specifically directed to the 
claims of service members and civilian employees of the War 
Department.115  Accordingly, Congress enacted the Military Personnel 
Claims Act of 1945.116   
A key change made by the newer act allowed military members and 
civilian employees to recover on claims for loss or damage to property 
even if that loss or damage was incurred incident-to-service.117  The 
incident-to-service bar however, was retained for claims alleging 
personal injury or death.118  The Military Claims Act and the Military 
                                                      
 109. Act of July 3, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 57 Stat. 372, 372–73. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. See H.R. REP. NO. 79–237, at 1–2 (1945) (“[T]he present statutes . . . do not 
grant equal justice in that the claim of one member of the Army may be approved 
while a similar claim by another member who lost property in the same incident  
is . . . barred by some technical limitation of the law.”). 
 115. Id. at 2–4 (attaching Letter from Robert Patterson, Acting Sec’y of War (Feb. 
2, 1945)). 
 116. Act of May 29, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-67, 59 Stat. 225 (codified with some 
difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§§ 2731–39 (2006)). 
 117. See 59 Stat. at 225–26. 
 118. Id. (“The provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to claims . . . for 
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Personnel Claims Act were codified together in the 1946 edition of 
the United States Code.119   
4. Private relief bills for injured service members & the Uniform 
Compensation System 
Like other citizens, members of the military can seek private 
legislation to compensate them for injuries caused by the 
government.120  In the years before the FTCA was enacted, private 
bills were not viable avenues to increased compensation for injured 
military service members, perhaps because of the general awareness 
that systems were in place to provide appropriate relief121 and out of 
concern for uniformity.122  In fact, from 1942 through 1947, no 
private bills granting monetary benefits to World War II veterans or 
their dependents became law.123   
The 79th Congress did act favorably on a private bill that would 
have awarded $500 in money damages to Ensign Joseph Lanser for 
injuries he incurred in a Navy bus accident on August 26, 1944, while 
serving in the military.124  However, on August 2, 1946, the same day 
he signed the FTCA into law, President Truman vetoed the Lanser 
private bill to preserve the established uniform system for the 
compensation of those injured while in military service.125  The 
President was typically succinct in explaining why he decided to veto 
the serviceman’s remedy: 
Ensign Lanser was on active duty with the Navy at the time of the 
accident.  He was hospitalized in a naval hospital and is entitled to 
                                                      
personal injury or death of military personnel or civilian employees of the War 
Department or of the Army if such injury or death occurs incident to their service.” 
(emphasis added)).   
 119. 31 U.S.C. § 223b.  In 1945 the Secretary of the Navy received comparable 
authority.  Act of December 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-277, 59 Stat. 662 (codified with 
some difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 2731-39 (2006)).  The compensation provided for injury or death not “incident to 
service” was limited to reasonable medical and burial expenses.  31 U.S.C. § 223b 
(1946). 
 120. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 
77 F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948) aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  
 122. See infra text accompanying notes 124–33 (comments of Presidents Truman 
and Eisenhower). 
 123. 1947 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 146; 1946 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. 
ANN. REP. 108; 1945 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 69; 1944 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ 
AFFS. ANN. REP. 68; 1943 ADM’R OF VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 66; 1942 ADM’R OF 
VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 67.  Indeed, as of 1947 only two private bills granting 
financial relief to World War I veterans had become law.  See 1947 ADM’R OF 
VETERANS’ AFFS. ANN. REP. 146. 
 124. H.R. DOC. NO. 79–767, at 1–2 (1946)(returning H.R. 4660, a bill for the relief 
of Mrs. Georgia Lanser and Ensign Joseph Lanser, without his approval). 
 125. Id. 
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the same rights and benefits extended to all other members of the 
armed forces who sustained personal injuries while in an active 
duty status.  No reason is evident why special treatment should be 
accorded this officer.126 
In 1948, President Truman again cited the importance of treating 
injured service members uniformly when he vetoed a $4,244 private 
bill for the relief of the estate of Lee Jones Cardy, a Navy chief 
pharmacist mate who was killed in a vehicle accident caused by 
government negligence near San Diego on November 17, 1944.127  
The President explained that “[a]pproval of this measure . . . would 
be discriminatory in character in that it would grant to the estate a 
special benefit denied to the estates of other members of the armed 
forces where the facts are similar.”128  He noted in detail the benefits 
Chief Cardy’s family would receive under laws administered by the 
Veterans’ Administration and the military services,129 and found that 
payment of those benefits distinguished this private bill from those of 
civilians who had no administrative remedy.130  
President Eisenhower voiced similar concerns when he vetoed 
private relief legislation intended to override final Veterans’ 
Administration decisions denying benefits.131  In vetoing a bill that 
                                                      
 126. Id. at 1. 
 127. Harry S Truman, S. DOC. NO. 80–179, at 1–3 (1948) (returning, without his 
approval, bill S. 252 for the relief of the estate of Lee Jones Cardy). 
 128. Id. at 2–3.   
 129. Id. at 2.  These included:  Navy-paid death gratuity payment equal to six 
months pay ($756); Army-paid burial expenses ($227.93); Veterans’ Administration 
monthly payments for death compensation to Mr. Cardy’s widow ($78/month); 
Veterans’ Administration monthly payments for death compensation to Mr. Cardy’s 
mother ($54/month); and Government life insurance monthly installments ($36.20) 
from Mr. Cardy’s $10,000 policy.  Id.  The 1947 median income for a male U.S. 
Worker was $2,324.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1988 to 2003 
Annual Social and Economic Supplements, 
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p53ar.html. 
 130. S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 3.  President Truman likewise vetoed a private bill that 
would have paid a lump sum of $10,000 to pilot Ernest Jenkins who was injured in a 
1942 Georgia airplane crash while on active duty with the Civil Air Patrol.  Harry S 
Truman, S. DOC. NO. 81-120, at 1–3 (1949)(returning bill S. 377, an Act for the Relief 
of Ernest J. Jenkins, without his approval).  The President stated: 
[I]t is clear that to single [Jenkins] out for special treatment in this fashion 
would discriminate against and deny equal justice to others who may have 
suffered equally or worse.  
  The records of the Civil Air Patrol indicate that over 50 of its members 
lost their lives and somewhat less than 100 were injured on its missions in 
World War II.  Benefits are still being paid under the civilian war-benefits 
program to the dependents of 33 members who were killed and to  
4 members who were injured. 
Id. at 2. 
 131. H.R. DOC. NO. 83–426, at 1–3 (1954) (returning bill H.R. 3109, 83d Cong. 
(1954) an Act for the relief of Theodore W. Carlson, without his approval). 
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would have deemed a World War II veteran’s eye injury to be service-
connected, the President stated: 
I consider it unwise to set aside the principles and rules of 
administration prescribed in the general laws governing veterans’ 
benefit programs.  Uniformity and equality of treatment to all who 
are similarly situated must be the steadfast rule if the Federal 
programs for veterans and their dependents are to be operated 
successfully. 132 
He used identical language when he vetoed a bill that decreed a 
soldier who committed suicide in 1943 while in a Mississippi 
guardhouse “shall be held and considered to have [died] in line of 
duty.”133   
II. JUDICIAL ANTECEDENTS TO FERES AFTER ENACTMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
This part examines the key, pre-Feres judicial decisions that 
addressed whether, and to what extent, the FTCA provided a remedy 
to members of the military.  It begins by examining the two seminal 
district court opinions in Jefferson v. United States134 that influenced 
much of the subsequent jurisprudence.135  It discusses the Brooks v. 
United States136 litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
decision, reached a year before Feres, which held that the FTCA 
authorized suits by service members for injuries that did not arise 
incident to military service.137  It ends by describing the Jefferson, 
Griggs, and Feres circuit court decisions that were jointly heard by the 
Supreme Court in Feres.138 
A. Judge Chesnut & Jefferson v. United States 
In the Jefferson litigation, United States District Judge William 
Chesnut of the District of Maryland issued a pair of influential 
opinions that laid the groundwork for the Feres debate.139  The Jefferson 
cases arose from an army surgeon’s negligence in leaving a thirty-inch 
                                                      
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-432, at 1–2 (1954) (returning bill H.R. 6242, 83d Cong. 
(1954) an Act for the relief of Mrs. Josette L. St. Marie, without his approval). 
 134. 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub 
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 
209 (D. Md. 1947). 
 135. Supra note 135. 
 136. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 137. Id. at 54. 
 138. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 
1949), rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Feres v. United 
States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 139. See Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708; Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 210. 
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by eighteen-inch towel in the body cavity of his patient, Army flight 
chief Arthur Jefferson, an active duty soldier.140  The United States 
moved to dismiss, arguing that Congress had not intended for the 
FTCA to authorize suits by service members for the negligence of 
other service members.141  It reasoned that the veterans’ benefits 
programs provided an exclusive remedy, citing Public Vessel Act cases 
which held that military members could not sue the government in 
tort although that statute waived sovereign immunity for injuries 
caused by a United States public vessel.142  The government also 
argued that the relationship between it and its service members was 
of a special nature unlike typical master-servant or employer-
employee relations.  Therefore, it concluded, Congress did not 
intend the FTCA to apply to claims arising from the mutual duties 
and obligations running between military members and the 
government which are governed by federal law143 when the FTCA 
applies the tort law applicable to private persons under the state law 
“of the place where the act or omission occurred.”144   
In a carefully written opinion of October 23, 1947, Judge Chesnut 
denied the United States’ motion to dismiss without prejudice.145  
While acknowledging the “plausibility and force”146 of the argument 
                                                      
 140. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708. 
 141. Id. at 711. 
 142. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 210–11 (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 
(2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)).   
 143. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 211 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 
301 (1947)).  In Standard Oil, the government sought to recover the amount of pay 
and medical expenses it had expended for a soldier injured by a negligently driven 
Standard Oil truck.  332 U.S. at 302.  The Court declined to decide the case under 
state law, reasoning that: 
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more 
distinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its 
armed forces.  To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations 
between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or 
nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and 
consequences of the relation between persons in service and the 
Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed 
by federal authority. 
Id. at 305–06.  It explained that state law is inappropriate for deciding such issues.  
Id. at 309–10 (“Not only is the government-soldier relation distinctively and 
exclusively a creation of federal law, but we know of no good reason why the 
Government’s right to be indemnified in these circumstances . . . should vary in 
accordance with the different rulings of the several states . . . .”).  The Court held 
that the United States could not recover because it is for Congress to decide whether 
the United States can bring suit to recover losses it sustains for injury to its soldiers, 
and Congress had not created such a cause of action.  Id. at 315–17. 
 144. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 211 (quoting Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No.  
79-601 § 402(b), 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006))). The 
government also argued that under general Military Law, a government is not liable 
to a soldier of the militia injured by the negligence of fellow soldiers.  Id. at 214.  
 145. Id. at 209–10, 216. 
 146. Id. at 211. 
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that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to authorize all suits by 
members of the military because it had created “an elaborate system 
of disability and pension allowances”147 for them, he noted that the 
Act specifically included members of the military in its definitions of 
“‘Employee of the Government’ [and] ‘[a]cting within the scope 
of . . . employment,’”148 thereby bringing their torts within the Act’s 
general waiver of sovereign immunity.149  He also noted that the Act 
included twelve enumerated exceptions to the general waiver, but not 
one explicitly for claims by service members although prior legislative 
proposals had included an exception for “claims for which 
compensation was provided by the . . . World War Veterans’ Act of 
1924.”150  He expressed concern that the Public Vessels Act cases were 
distinguishable because that act had very general language about who 
could bring suit151 compared to the FTCA’s explicit jurisdictional 
grant152 and its clear intent to allow suits against the government for 
“the negligent acts of military personnel.”153  Recognizing that the 
military stands in a special, federal relationship to the government,154 
he acknowledged that there may be merit to the argument that 
allowing the Jefferson suit might create a “heretofore non-existent 
tort, . . . not within the intention of Congress” under circumstances 
where a private person would not be liable under state law as 
required by the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant.155  Nonetheless, he was 
not persuaded, concluding that the motion to dismiss should be 
denied without prejudice, but suggesting that, “[p]erhaps the proper 
application of the Act will become clearer on further argument and 
consideration and the possible narrowing of issues by the developed 
facts of the particular case.”156 
On May 7, 1948, following a trial on the merits, Judge Chesnut 
revisited the government’s motion to dismiss and issued a second 
opinion.157  The judge made findings of fact that during a 
cholecystostomy operation on July 3, 1945, while Mr. Jefferson was on 
                                                      
 147. Id. at 210. 
 148. Id. at 211 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act § 402(b)–(c) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2671 (2006))). 
 149. Id. at 211. 
 150. Id. at 211–12 (citing 86 CONG. REC. 12015–32 (1940)). 
 151. Id. at 212–13. 
 152. Id. at 213 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act § 410(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1346(b) (2006))). 
 153. Id. at 214. 
 154. Id. at 215 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310–11 
(1947)).  
 155. Id. at 215. 
 156. Id. at 216. 
 157. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 706, 711 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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active duty,158 his military surgeon negligently left in his body cavity a 
towel thirty inches long and eighteen inches wide, marked “Medical 
Department U.S. Army.”159  The towel was removed when it was 
discovered during an operation on March 13, 1946.160  Mr. Jefferson 
suffered a serious hernia which made it doubtful that he could return 
to his occupation as a mechanic.161  After his discharge, Mr. Jefferson 
applied for service-connected disability payments and, at the time of 
trial, was receiving 100% disability from the Veterans’ Administration 
of $138 per month, for a prospective lifetime award of $31,947.162  
The court found that had he been able to return to his prior 
employment, “[t]he commuted value of this earning capacity for 
[his] estimated life expectancy of 22 years would be about $45,000.”163  
Judge Chesnut concluded that if Jefferson had a valid claim under 
the FTCA and his administrative awards were deducted from his 
damages, “a sum of $7,500 would be an appropriate verdict.”164 
After setting forth his findings of fact, Judge Chesnut revisited the 
question raised in the government’s motion to dismiss.165  He cogently 
stated the issue: 
The problem of statutory construction now presented is whether 
the comprehensive phrase “any claim against the United States, for 
money only” . . . without words of limitation as to classes of persons 
who may make the claim, should be narrowed by construction to 
exclude claims made by members of the Armed Forces of the 
United States for service-connected injuries sustained while in such 
service, in view of the special relationship long existing between the 
United States and members of its military forces, and the large 
body of federal legislation upon the subject.  These include 
elaborate provisions for pay and allowances and retirement 
benefits . . . .166 
He recognized that the problem was especially difficult because the 
FTCA contained a number of explicit exceptions but none that 
barred all service-connected claims by service members, although a 
prior draft of the Act had included an exception “for the same 
                                                      
 158. Id. at 708.  Mr. Jefferson had enlisted in the Army on October 22, 1942, when 
he was forty-five years old, and received his honorable discharge on January 9, 1946.  
Id. 
 159. Id. at 708–09. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 709. 
 162. Id. at 710. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 710–11. 
 165. Id. at 711. 
 166. Id.  
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general purpose.”167  Nonetheless, he concluded that the FTCA did 
not encompass such claims.168 
In explaining this decision, Judge Chestnut noted the principle of 
statutory construction that a statute should not be read literally when, 
“from the whole subject matter of the particular Act and its setting in 
the whole governmental scheme, the court can see that the literal 
import of the phrase used is contrary to established policy and would 
not accord with the real intention of Congress in passing the Act.”169  
He recognized the “close precedent” of the Second Circuit Public 
Vessels Act170 cases that barred claims of service members despite 
statutory language that generally allowed suit “‘against the United 
States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United 
States.’”171  He cited Burkhardt v. United States172 for the proposition 
that the literal language of one phrase of the FTCA is “not applicable 
in view of other provisions of the Act.”173   
The judge explained that “the main purpose” of the FTCA was to 
waive sovereign immunity for “the ordinary run of tort claims arising 
in the United States,”174 but that the FTCA was only one part (Title 
IV) of the more comprehensive Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946.175  Title I of that Act prohibited private relief bills for claims that 
might be brought under the FTCA.176  He noted that Congress 
enacted this provision because it was overburdened by the deluge of 
such private bills and “that an important if not the main motivation 
of Congress in enacting the Tort Act was to transfer such claims to 
the courts.”177  He further noted that private bills to benefit service 
members for service-connected injuries were uncommon because of 
                                                      
 167. Id. at 712. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1935); Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918)). 
 170. Id. (citing Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 781–90 (1946) (now codified at 
46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–13 (2006))).   
 171. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. 
United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); O’Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 869 (2d 
Cir. 1926)).  
 172. 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947). 
 173. Id. at 712 (citing Burkhardt, 165 F.2d 869).  Burkhardt held that despite 
language of the FTCA limiting liability to “circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable [to the claimant] in accordance with the law of the 
place,” state statutes of limitations defenses are inapplicable because the FTCA 
included statutes of limitations. 165 F.2d at 871, 874 (citing FTCA § 410(a)). 
 174. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 712; see also id. at 713 (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1400 
(1946)); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2614 (1946). 
 175. Id. at 712. 
 176. Id. (citing Legislative Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 
812, 831 (1946)).  
 177. Id. 
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the many administrative remedies Congress had provided to them.178  
Accordingly, he found it “probable” that damages claims of soldiers 
for service-connected injuries “were not within the contemplation of 
Congress” when it enacted the FTCA.179 
Judge Chesnut concluded that claims of military members arising 
from their military duty did not fall within the FTCA’s jurisdictional 
language that defined the government’s tort liability by the standard 
of a private person under the law of the state where the tort took 
place, because “such injuries did not constitute common law or 
statutory torts under the laws of the several States,” and no “State 
legislation could properly have affected the relations of the United 
States to members of its armed forces which, of course, depended 
purely on federal law.”180  He found support for this conclusion in 
United States v. Standard Oil Co.,181 which held that the government had 
no right to subrogation for injuries to its military members because 
Congress had not created one “in federal law, and . . . it would be 
incongruous to give such a right of action in view of the variable State 
laws which might apply to any particular soldier dependent upon 
where he happened to be at the time.”182  He quoted Standard Oil’s 
summary of the “distinctively federal” nature of the United States’ 
relationship to its military members.183  He concluded that the FTCA’s 
private person under state law standard for assigning tort liability is 
“inapt” for the military plaintiff.184 
B. Brooks v. United States 
The Feres decision was foreshadowed by the Brooks v. United States185 
case, which the Supreme Court decided on May 16, 1949.186  In Brooks, 
two brothers on furlough from the Army187 were driving with their 
father in a private car on a public highway when a civilian federal 
                                                      
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 712–13. 
 180. Id. at 713. 
 181. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
 182. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 713 (“[W]e know of no good reason why the 
Government’s right to be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such a 
right, should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several states, simply 
because the soldier marches or today perhaps as often flies across state lines.” 
(quoting  Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 310)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 305). 
 184. Id. at 714 (“It is hardly conceivable to analogize the liability of the United 
States to that of a private individual in respect to service-connected disabilities in view 
of the government-soldier particular relationship.”). 
 185. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 186. Id. at 49. 
 187. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949).  The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion on August 26, 1948.  Id. at 840.  
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employee driving an Army truck negligently struck them.188  Following 
a trial on the merits, District Judge Cavanah entered a judgment of 
$4,000 for the personal injuries of Welker Brooks,189 and one of 
$25,000 for the wrongful death of Arthur Brooks.190  On January 7, 
1948, Judge Cavanah denied the government’s motion to dismiss; 
rejecting its argument that suit was barred because the Brooks 
brothers had received veterans’ benefits.191  He gave two reasons:  
First, unlike the North Carolina workers’ compensation statute, no 
federal statute declared veterans’ benefits to be an exclusive 
remedy.192  Second, because the FTCA made the government liable in 
the same manner as a private person and the then-recent Ninth 
Circuit Standard Oil decision allowed a service member to recover 
both administratively from the veterans’ benefit program and in tort 
from a tortfeasor without subrogation by the government, “it would 
follow that the government may make veterans’ payments to the 
plaintiff and at the same time be liable to him as a tortfeasor.”193   
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed in a split decision.194  
Writing for the majority, Judge Dobie adopted much of Judge 
Chesnut’s analysis in Jefferson, but went beyond it to conclude that all 
claims of military members were excluded from the FTCA, not just 
those that arose from their military service.195  The court noted the 
comprehensive nature of the compensation system for service 
members and veterans,196 the unique relationship between service 
members and the federal government,197 and the incongruity of 
barring suit by service members injured in combat or foreign lands 
but allowing claims arising from non-combat domestic activities: 
Thus, under the [combatant activity] exception, a soldier killed or 
injured in the important and perilous combat activities of war 
                                                      
 188. 337 U.S. at 50. 
 189. Id.; United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 483 (4th Cir. 1949). 
 190. Brooks, 176 F.2d at 484.  The father, James Brooks, received a judgment of 
$5,000 for his personal injuries.  Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51 n.1; Transcript of Record at 
27, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 388 and 389).  
 191. Transcript of Record at 19, supra note 191. 
 192. Id. at 26. 
 193. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946), 
aff’d, 332 U.S. 301 (1947)). 
 194. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949). 
 195. Id. at 842–45 (citing Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711–14 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 
178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 
(1950)) (“We are quite unable to find in the Act anything which would justify us in 
holding that Congress intended to include death of, or injury to, a soldier, which was 
not service-caused (the instant case) and to exclude service-caused injury or death 
(the Jefferson case).”)). 
 196. Id. at 842–43. 
 197. Id. at 842. 
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would be denied a recovery; while there would be a perfect claim 
for the soldier killed or injured in non-combat activities. Under the 
[foreign tort] exception, for a soldier injured or killed while 
stationed in Canada, no recovery; for a soldier injured or killed at 
Plattsburg, New York, just a few miles from the Canadian border, 
again a recovery. It is difficult for us to think that Congress 
intended such results to flow from the Federal Tort Claims Act.198   
Judge Dobie relied on the Dobson and Bradey Public Vessels Act 
decisions199 and the Sandoval Railroad Control Act opinion, all of 
which held that general waivers of sovereign immunity do not allow 
suits by service members when Congress has provided them with an 
administrative remedy.200 
In dissent, Chief Judge Parker argued it was unreasonable to think 
that Congress would overlook the potential tort “claims of soldiers . . . 
at a time when soldiers and their rights were so prominently in the 
public mind.”201  He reasoned that the FTCA included twelve 
exceptions, but not one for claims of military members,202 although a 
prior version of the Act had included an exception barring “[a]ny 
claim for which compensation is provided by the Federal Employees’ 
Compensation Act, as amended, or by the World War Veterans’ Act 
of 1924, as amended.”203  He rejected the argument that allowing suits 
for claims “not arising out of service” would disrupt military 
discipline.204  He pointedly noted that the Brooks’ claims did not 
involve injuries arising from their military service as had those in 
Jefferson, and “[e]ntirely different considerations might operate to 
deny recovery in such case, as [was] suggested in the opinion of 
Judge Chesnut.”205 
Facing this body of law, counsel for the Brooks crafted petitions for 
certiorari to avoid the key adverse authority by emphasizing that the 
brothers’ activities at the time of the accident were entirely divorced 
from their military service.  They framed the “Questions Involved” as: 
                                                      
 198. Id. at 844. 
 199. Id. at 843–44 (quoting Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742, 743 (2d. Cir. 
1945); Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, 808, 809 (2d. Cir. 1928)) (“If it had 
been the purpose to change that policy as respects officers and seamen of the navy 
injured . . . by the fault of one another, because that is what in the end it comes to, 
we cannot think it would have been left to such general language . . . .”). 
 200. Id. at 844 (citing Sandoval v. Davis, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923)). 
 201. Id. at 847 (Parker, C.J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 848. 
 203. Id. at 849 (noting that the missing exception “was omitted, with apparent 
deliberation” (citing Federal Tort Claims Act, H.R. 181, 79th Cong. (1945)); S. REP. 
NO. 79-1400, at 30 (1946)). 
 204. Id. at 850. 
 205. Id. 
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 Did Congress intend that members of the armed services should 
have no rights of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act? 
 More particularly, if a member of the armed services is injured 
under circumstances wholly unconnected with military affairs and 
not in any way growing out of any armed service status or 
relationship, and if the situation is one which may readily occur 
and does occur with respect to persons not in the armed service 
and is a situation in which other persons, in general, do clearly 
have rights of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act—did 
Congress nevertheless intend that in such situation the claimant, 
merely because of the circumstance that he belongs to the armed 
service, shall have no right of action?206 
They argued that, “Welker B. Brooks and Arthur L. Brooks were 
soldiers.  But their being soldiers had nothing whatever to do with their 
respective injury and death” or the brothers’ presence “on the 
highway.”207  They distinguished Dobson, Bradey, and Sandoval because, 
unlike the Brooks’ situation, “the injuries involved in [those] . . . 
cases were ‘service-caused,’ that is, occurred because the injured men 
were members of the armed forces and incurred their injuries during 
the course of activities necessitated by or incident to their military 
service.”208  They distinguished Jefferson on the same grounds, arguing 
Jefferson “was on the operating table . . . only because of his being a 
soldier. The army surgeon was operating on him only because of the 
military and army relationship between the two of them.”209  The 
Supreme Court granted the Brooks’ petitions for certiorari on 
January 3, 1949.210  
The United States began its argument with the cases that excluded 
claims of service members from general waivers of the government’s 
tort sovereign immunity.211  In response to the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the brothers’ injuries were not connected to their military 
service, the government maintained that the cases barring tort suits 
of service members turned on the existence of the comprehensive 
                                                      
 206. Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 3, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949) (Nos. 388 and 389). 
 207. Brief in Support of Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 16, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 
(Nos. 388 and 389).   
 208. Id. at 21. 
 209. Id. at 22. 
 210. Brooks v. United States, 335 U.S. 901 (1949).  The Brooks’ petitions were 
filed on October 30, 1948, in both the personal injury case and the wrongful death 
case.  Petition for Writs of Certiorari, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 388 and 389).  
Accordingly, two orders were entered when the petitions were granted.  Brooks,  
335 U.S. 901.    
 211. U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60 at 6, 10–18.  Thus, the government cited Dobson, 
id. at 12–13; Bradey, id. at 13–14; cases construing the Railroad Control Act of 1918, 
id. at 14–16; and the New York Tort Claims Act, id. at 16. 
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compensation system rather than the manner in which the injury was 
incurred.212  The government went on to argue that Congress had 
provided an “adequate and comprehensive statutory system for 
handling death or injury claims of members of the armed forces,”213 
and that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to provide duplicate 
compensation.214  It explained that while a primary purpose of the 
Legislative Reform Act of 1946 and the FTCA was to increase 
legislative efficiency by removing Congress’ responsibility for 
deciding private bills involving torts by assigning that job to the 
courts,215 the number of private bills seeking money for injured or 
killed service members was insignificant.216  It reasoned that because 
the FTCA was enacted to allow the courts to decide claims that would 
previously have been submitted to Congress as private bills by those 
who had no administrative remedy, “it is reasonable to assume that 
Congress did not intend the Act [to] encompass an entirely new and 
distinct group of claims arising out of the death or injury to soldiers 
for which it had already adequately provided.”217  The government 
also argued that the plaintiffs’ acceptance of statutory benefits barred 
any recovery under the FTCA.218   
The Supreme Court framed the question before it as “whether 
members of the United States armed forces can recover under [the 
FTCA] for injuries not incident to their service.”219  To answer that 
question, the Court examined as best it could what Congress had 
intended when it enacted the FTCA.220  The Court concluded that the 
FTCA did waive sovereign immunity for such claims.221  Justices 
Frankfurter and Douglass dissented “substantially for the reasons set 
forth by Judge Dobie.”222 
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that neither the 
veterans’ laws nor the FTCA explicitly stated that the remedies they 
                                                      
 212. See id. at 49 (“The rationale of those cases was not, as contended by 
petitioner, the fact that the injuries were service-caused, but rather that there was in 
existence a comprehensive statutory system for making payment on such claims.”). 
 213. See id. at 6–7; see also id. at 17–30.   
 214. See id. at 8–10, 30–49. 
 215. See id. at 30–33. 
 216. See id. at 33–35. 
 217. Id. at 36. 
 218. See id. at 50–52. 
 219. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949). 
 220. See id. at 51 (arguing that the overseas and combatant activities exceptions 
made it plain that Congress had service members in mind when the statute was 
passed in 1946); id. at 52 (stating that consequences may provide insight for 
determining congressional purpose); id. at 53 (seeing no indication that Congress 
meant the United States to pay twice for the same injury).   
 221. See id. at 54. 
 222. Id. (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (citing United States v. Brooks, 
169 F.2d 840 (2d. Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
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provided were exclusive of other remedies, and that Congress had 
not required an election of remedies.223  It noted the FTCA’s 
exceptions for combatant activities and foreign torts, and the absence 
of an exception for claims that might be compensated under the 
World War Veterans’ Act of 1924 that had been included in prior 
legislative drafts.224  Together, these suggested to the Court that 
Congress did have service members in mind when it enacted the 
FTCA.225   
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged the potential 
legitimacy of the government’s argument that Congress did not 
intend to waive immunity for claims by service members for  
“[a] battle commander’s poor judgment, an army surgeon’s slip of 
hand, [or] a defective jeep which causes injury.”226  While recognizing 
the substantial authority that might support the government’s 
argument in suits involving military situations,227 the Court concluded 
that the Brooks facts did not raise the issue because the brothers’ 
injuries were not related to their military service: 
But we are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with 
the Brooks’ army careers, injuries not caused by their service 
except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has 
already transpired. Were the accident incident to the Brooks’ 
service, a wholly different case would be presented. We express no 
opinion as to it, but we may note that only in its context do [Dobson, 
Bradey, and Jefferson] have any relevance.  See the similar distinction 
in 31 U.S.C. § 223b [the Military Claims Act and the Military 
Personnel Claims Act]. . . .  The Government’s fears may have [a] 
point in reflecting congressional purpose to leave injuries incident-
to-service where they were, despite literal language and other 
considerations to the contrary.  The result may be so outlandish 
that even the factors we have mentioned would not permit 
recovery.  But that is not the case before us.228 
Accordingly, the Court left for another day the question whether the 
FTCA allows suit by service members for claims arising incident to 
military service.229  Three cases squarely raising that question were in 
the judicial pipeline. 
                                                      
 223. See id. at 53. 
 224. See id. at 51–52. 
 225. See id. at 52. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. 
United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 
(D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). 
 228. Id. at 52–53 (citation omitted). 
 229. Id. at 53.  The Court remanded the case for determination whether the 
judgment should be reduced for previously paid administrative remedies, and 
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C. The Feres, Griggs, & Jefferson Circuit Court Decisions 
In 1949, three circuit courts rendered decisions squarely dealing 
with the issue of whether the FTCA waived sovereign immunity for 
claims arising from injuries incurred incident to military service.230  
These cases were decided together in the Court’s Feres opinion.231 
1. Feres v. United States 
The Feres litigation alleged that a barracks fire and the death of 
U.S. Army Lieutenant Rudolph Feres were caused by government 
negligence in maintaining a defective heating plant and failing to 
guard against fire.232  Lieutenant Feres was quartered under orders in 
the barracks in Pine Camp, New York, a federal military post.233  The 
district court dismissed the case, relying on the Fourth Circuit’s Brooks 
decision.234  On November 4, 1949, in an opinion by Judge Augustus 
Hand, the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed.235 
The Second Circuit concluded that its Dobson and Bradey 
precedents, as followed by Judge Chesnut in Jefferson, correctly stated 
the established rule that service members cannot sue the government 
in tort for incident-to-service injuries.236  Accordingly, “[i]f more than 
the pension system had been contemplated to recompense soldiers 
engaged in military service we think that Congress would not have 
left such relief to be implied from the general terms of the Tort 
Claims Act, but would have specifically provided for it.”237  The court 
saw the Supreme Court’s Brooks decision to have recognized an 
“exception to this interpretation [for] . . . situations where military 
personnel were not on active duty.”238   
The court directly addressed the FTCA’s twelve exceptions, noting 
that, “they relate to the cause of injury rather than to the character of 
a claimant who may seek to recover damages for his injuries.”239  The 
                                                      
whether that issue had been preserved for appeal.  Id. at 54.  
 230. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 
1949), rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Feres v. United 
States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 231. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136–37. 
 232. 177 F.2d at 536. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d,  
337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 235. Id. at 535. 
 236. Id. at 537 (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); 
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 
1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States,  
340 U.S. 135 (1950)). 
 237. Id. at 537. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  
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court recognized that even though the exceptions “relieve the 
government in certain situations from liability to all persons 
including civilians, they do not mention soldiers specifically” and 
“[t]here would seem to have been no reason for mentioning soldiers 
when the latter had not been treated as having claims for injuries 
incident to their service.”240  The court gave short shrift to the 
argument that Congress intended to allow FTCA suits for incident-to-
service injuries because it had omitted from the FTCA a proposed 
thirteenth exception for, “‘[a]ny claim for which compensation is 
provided by [Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)],  
as amended, or by the World War Veterans Act of 1924, as 
amended.’”241  Judge Augustus Hand reasoned that FECA, as 
amended, provided that an employee receiving benefits under that 
act, “‘shall not receive from the United States any salary, pay, or 
remuneration whatsoever except in return for services actually 
performed, and except pensions for [military] service.’”242  Likewise, 
“the World War Veterans’ Act of 1924, as amended, provided that ‘no 
other pension laws or laws providing for gratuities or payments in the 
event of death in the service’ . . . shall be applicable to disabilities or 
deaths made compensable under the Act.”243  Accordingly, the 
proposed thirteenth exception was likely judged “unnecessary.”244  
Consequently, the court affirmed dismissal of the suit.245 
2. Griggs v. United States 
Griggs v. United States246 alleged that Lt. Colonel Dudley Griggs 
underwent surgery at an Army hospital at Scott Air Base, Illinois, and 
died as a result of medical malpractice by members of the Army 
Medical Corps.247  Lt. Colonel Griggs was on active duty and was 
admitted to the hospital under orders.248  The district court granted 
the government’s motion to dismiss on grounds that the complaint 
failed to state a claim for relief under the FTCA.249  On November 16, 
1949, a divided Tenth Circuit panel reversed that holding.250 
                                                      
 240. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C.A. § 223b (1946)). 
 241. Id. (citing H.R. 181, 79th Cong. (1945)).  
 242. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 757 (1946)). 
 243. Id. at 537–38 (quoting 38 U.S.C.A. § 422 (1946)). 
 244. Id. at 538. 
 245. Id. 
 246. 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 
(1950). 
 247. Id. at 2. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 3. 
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Judge Murrah, writing for the majority, acknowledged that in 
Jefferson, Judge Chesnut had concluded that the broad benefits 
Congress provided to veterans indicate that “the obvious purpose of 
Congress was to exclude” from FTCA coverage those claims that arise 
from the “unique Government-soldier relationship.”251  However, he 
then noted that the Supreme Court in Brooks “was not moved by such 
considerations.”252  The opinion reasoned that a claim for injury to a 
service member was valid under the FTCA “unless it [fell] within one 
of the twelve exceptions specifically provided therein; or, unless from 
the context of the Act it [was] manifestly plain that despite the literal 
import of the legislative words, Congress intended to exclude from 
coverage civil actions on claims arising out of a Government-soldier 
relationship.”253  Judge Murrah found nothing in the legislative 
history “justifying judicial limitation upon the claims of 
servicemen.”254  He observed that although Congress had included 
express exceptions for military claims in eighteen proposed tort 
claims bills, “it conspicuously omitted” from the FTCA an exception 
for “claims growing out of a government-soldier relationship.”255  He 
concluded that Congress had deliberately decided not to exclude 
such claims from the Act.256  The opinion did not mention or address 
Bradey and Dobson.257  In dissent, Judge Huxman “adopt[ed] the 
reasoning of [Judge Chesnut in] the Jefferson case.”258 
3. Jefferson v. United States 
On December 19, 1949, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed Judge Chesnut’s decision that because Arthur Jefferson’s 
injuries arose from his military service, the FTCA did not provide a 
tort remedy for the medical malpractice that left a towel in his body 
cavity.259  The panel consisted of Judge Soper who authored the 
panel’s opinion,260 Judge Dobie who had written the Fourth Circuit 
majority opinion in Brooks,261 and Chief Judge Parker who had 
dissented in Brooks.262  
                                                      
 251. Id. at 2. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 2, 3. 
 254. Id. at 3. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id.   
 257. See id. at 1–3. 
 258. See id. at 3 (Huxman, J., dissenting). 
 259. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 519–20 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 260. Id. at 518. 
 261. Id.; United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 
49 (1949). 
 262. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 518; Brooks, 169 F.2d at 846. 
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The opinion noted that while the Jefferson litigation was proceeding 
before Judge Chesnut, the Supreme Court had decided in Brooks that 
service members could sue under the FTCA “for injuries not incident 
to their service, but left open the question whether the statute also 
cover[ed] claims by service men for injuries incident to their 
service.”263  It remarked that the Second and Tenth Circuits had come 
to opposite conclusions on that question in Feres and Griggs.264  The 
court characterized the choice as “between a literal interpretation of 
the Act and a construction which recognize[d] the peculiar 
relationship that exist[ed] between a member of the armed services 
and superior military authority.”265  It recognized that Congress 
enacted the FTCA to provide a remedy for “persons injured through 
the negligence of [government] employees” in the courts rather than 
through the inefficient private bill process “which burdened the 
legislative branch . . . and caused delay.”266  But the court saw limits on 
the scope of that remedy: 
It seems unreasonable, however, to conclude that Congress, while 
accomplishing these desirable purposes, intended at the same time 
to subject every injury sustained by a member of the armed forces 
in the execution of military orders to the examination of a court of 
justice . . . .  If this were so, the civil courts would be required to 
pass upon the propriety of military decisions and actions and 
essential military discipline would be impaired by subjecting the 
command to the public criticism and rebuke of any member of the 
armed forces who chose to bring a suit against the United States.267 
In concluding that the FTCA did not provide a remedy for  
in-service injuries, the court attached no importance to the fact that 
proposed exceptions for claims of military personnel were dropped 
before final passage of the Act.268  It supported its conclusion by 
noting the “distinctively federal character of the government-soldier 
relationship,”269 and the unreasonableness of supposing “in the 
absence of an express declaration on the point, that Congress 
intended to adopt so radical a departure from its historic policy as to 
subject internal relationships within the military establishment to the 
                                                      
 263. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 519. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 519–20. 
 266. Id. at 520. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. (citing Orders of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 529 (1946); Jewell 
Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167 United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 168 (1945) 
(stating that a court should not give too much weight to the language contained in 
discarded measures or to the statements of legislatures in the course of debate when 
interpreting a statute)).  
 269. Id. (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co. 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
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law of negligence as laid down by the courts of the several states.”270   
It recognized that Mr. Jefferson and other service members had a 
wide range of allowances and retirement benefits, providing them 
with generous remedies outside the tort arena.271  Finally, it cited the 
Second Circuit’s Dobson and Bradey decisions, which held in 
analogous circumstances that the Public Vessels Act waiver of 
sovereign immunity allowing persons to sue “the United States in 
personam for damages caused by the negligent handling of a public 
vessel refers to damages suffered by third persons but not by 
members of the ship’s company.”272  It affirmed Judge Chesnut’s 
dismissal of the action.273 
III. THE SUPREME COURT & THE FERES DOCTRINE 
This Part reviews the parties’ arguments to the Supreme Court, 
summarizes the Court’s Feres opinion, and briefly reviews the Court’s 
other opinions related to the Feres doctrine. 
A. The Parties’ Arguments 
1. The United States’ Arguments 
The United States presented its principal arguments to the 
Supreme Court in its Griggs petitioner’s brief.274  The government 
began by arguing that Brooks had impliedly recognized that injuries 
suffered incident-to-service fell outside the Brooks holding that service 
members could sue under the FTCA.275  It reasoned that drawing a 
distinction between injuries incurred on furlough and those incurred 
while receiving medical care under orders was mandated by the need 
to avoid subjecting claims arising from military orders to varying state 
law rules or judicial review which would undermine military 
discipline.276  It noted that this distinction explained why Judge 
Parker concluded that the Brooks brothers could sue under the 
FTCA, but Arthur Jefferson could not.277  The government cited as 
                                                      
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. (citing Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 
(4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).  
 272. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. 
United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Griggs, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) 
(No. 31) [hereinafter U.S. Griggs Br.]; Brief for the United States at 3, Feres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 9) [hereinafter U.S. Feres Br.]; Brief for the United 
States at 4, Jefferson v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 29) [hereinafter 
 U.S. Jefferson Br.].  
 275. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 275, at 9–13. 
 276. See id. at 13. 
 277. See id. at 12–13. 
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direct precedent involving “the identical problem presented . . . 
here,”278 the Dobson and Bradey Public Vessel Act decisions and the 
Railroad Control Act cases that barred suit for incident-to-service 
injuries under those waivers of sovereign immunity.279  It noted that in 
Brooks, the Court had recognized that Dobson and Bradey “would have 
relevance if the accident had occurred incident to the soldier’s 
military service.”280 
The United States then argued that Congress had not intended for 
the FTCA to apply to incident-to-service claims of military members.281  
Starting from the Court’s Brooks admonition that the consequences of 
an interpretation allowing such suits “may provide insight for 
determination of congressional purpose,”282 it reasoned that the 
unique, completely federal relationship between government and 
soldier recognized by the Court in Standard Oil Co.283 was 
incompatible with the FTCA’s requirement that tort liability of the 
government be assessed under state law.284  It noted the impropriety 
of subjecting that relationship to “dissimilar and frequently 
irreconcilable state statutes and decisions.”285  It argued that because 
the FTCA waived sovereign immunity only under circumstances 
where a private person would be liable under state law, and because 
state law did not allow one service member to sue another for 
negligence, the United States could not be liable on a respondeat 
superior basis for that negligence.286  It reasoned that if military 
members could bring suit for service-connected injuries, “it is obvious 
that the military decisions, orders, and conduct which constituted the 
basis for the [claim] . . . would be thrown open to judicial 
examination,”287 undermining military discipline.288  It argued that the 
Legislative Reorganization Act’s repeal289 of portions of the Military 
                                                      
 278. Id. at 18. 
 279. See id. at 14–19. 
 280. See id. at 14 (citing United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)). 
 281. See id. at 19–28. 
 282. Id. at 20 (quoting Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52). 
 283. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305–06 (1947) (holding that 
the United States could not seek indemnity under state law for payments it made on 
behalf of an injured soldier because the relationship between the Government and 
service members was governed entirely by federal law). 
 284. U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 21–26.   
 285. Id. at 21. 
 286. See id. at 33–37. 
 287. Id. at 27; see id. at 26–28 (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 845 
(4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 288. See id. at 35–36; see also id. at 24–28. 
 289. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 repealed those statutes that 
allowed agencies to make compensatory payments to persons injured by government 
negligence.  Pub. L. No. 79–601, § 424a, 60 Stat. 812, 846 (1946). 
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Claims Act290 did not authorize suit for incident-to-service injuries 
because only provisions allowing recovery were repealed and the 
“Military Claims Act . . . does not include claims by servicemen for 
injury or death sustained by them incident to their military service.”291  
The government concluded by noting that the military and veterans’ 
benefits laws provided ready compensation for injured service 
members and their families.292 
2. The Plaintiffs’ Arguments 
The Griggs, Jefferson, and Feres plaintiffs all argued that the Brooks 
holding authorized their suits because there was no basis for 
distinguishing soldiers on furlough from those asleep in barracks or 
receiving care in hospitals.293  The plaintiffs argued that the FTCA’s 
language was plain on its face and allowed their suits.294  They argued 
that under canons of construction, the FTCA should be interpreted 
to allow incident-to-service claims, pointing to the FTCA’s exceptions 
for discretionary functions,295 combatant activities,296 and foreign 
torts,297 and the deletion from the FTCA of a comparable exception 
for service members’ claims that had been in prior drafts:  “[T]he 
deliberate rejection of this proposed exception demonstrate[s] that 
Congress did not intend to exclude members of the armed forces 
suffering injuries or death in the United States, and not in combat, 
regardless of any other rights . . . conferred under the World War 
                                                      
 290. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 29.  When the brief mentions the 
Military Claims Act, it cites 31 U.S.C. § 223b and apparently refers to both the 
Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act.  Id. at 29–30. 
 291. See id. at 30. 
 292. See id. at 37–39 (noting that Mrs. Griggs could expect to receive over $22,000 
in compensation from her various federal benefits, but that the Illinois wrongful 
death statute limited damages to $15,000); see also U.S. Jefferson Br., supra note 274, at 
3–4 (noting that Jefferson could expect to receive approximately $35,500 in benefits, 
roughly $7,500 less than the judgment value of his case).  The United States also 
incorporated by reference, arguments raised in its Brooks brief.  See U.S. Griggs Br., 
supra note 274, at 30 n.9. 
 293. Brief for Respondent at 6–7, 10–11, United States v. Griggs, 340 U.S. 135 
(1950) (No. 31) [hereinafter Resp’t Griggs Br.]; Brief For Petitioner at 14–17, Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 9) [hereinafter Pet’r Feres Br.]; Brief for 
Petitioner at 4–7, Jefferson v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 29) 
[hereinafter Pet’r Jefferson Br.] (“Whether injured on furlough or in an army 
hospital, each is on active duty and subject to military control though not engaged in 
the performance of their normal duties, each is entitled to the same special statutory 
benefits . . . .”) (emphasis in original).  
 294. See Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 5–7; Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 
7–8; Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 10; see also id., at 7 (stating that the Act was 
just as clear as it was in the Brooks case).  
 295. See Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 13.  
 296. Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 6; Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 16; 
Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 15.  
 297. Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 6; Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 16.  
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Veterans’ Act of 1924 as amended.”298  Their overarching argument 
was that “[n]either the act as written, its legislative history or avowed 
purpose permitted the [c]ourt below to read into the act an 
exception that was not there.”299 
Responding to the government’s arguments, the plaintiffs urged 
that Dobson, Bradey, and similar cases arose under statutes that were 
narrower in scope and purpose than the FTCA,300 and that when 
Congress deleted the proposed World War Veterans Act exception, it 
“repudiated and made inapplicable to the [FTCA] the doctrine of 
the Dodson [sic] . . . [and] Bradey case[s].”301  They raised the same 
point in response to the defense’s argument that applying state law to 
tort claims by service members was incompatible with the federal 
nature of that relationship and not something Congress had 
contemplated.302  They further argued that Congress had 
appropriately chosen to “make the laws of the different states the test 
of liability” for service members, as it had for other federal matters 
such as tax law and bankruptcy law,303 and that the FTCA’s exceptions 
and various state law defenses adequately protected the government’s 
interests.304  Griggs argued that Congress’ failure to include 
exclusionary “service caused claims” language in the FTCA as it had 
in the Military Claims Act, “indicate[d] that Congress did not choose 
to exclude such claims from [the FTCA].”305  Jefferson and Feres 
argued that the Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims 
Act had no bearing here because they provided compensation 
without regard to fault and the FTCA required a negligent or 
wrongful act.306   
                                                      
 298. Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 8–11 (citing United States v. Brooks,  
337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)) (noting that sixteen of the eighteen bills introduced between 
1925 and 1935 for tort claims acts had proposed the exclusion of claims for service 
members); Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 7–8. 
 299. Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 5.  Feres also argued that because the FTCA 
was complementary to the provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act banning 
private bills on tort claims, “it seem[ed] evident . . . that Congress wanted to rid itself 
of the great number of private bills for relief of military personnel and their families 
presented at every session.”  Id. at 12. 
 300. Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 18 (“The decisions in the Dobson and Bradey 
cases are founded upon acts whose legislative history and purpose are not parallel to 
the [FTCA].”); Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 10–11 (arguing that the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the FTCA had a “double purpose” of 
removing “the anachronistic doctrine of sovereign immunity to actions in tort . . . 
and . . . reliev[ing] Congress of the burden of . . . private bills” that demonstrate a 
different policy than the maritime statutes addressed by Dobson and Bradey). 
 301. Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 14. 
 302. See id. at 16. 
 303. See id. at 16–17. 
 304. See Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16–17. 
 305. See Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 19. 
 306. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) 
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The plaintiffs argued that the military and veterans compensation 
statutes did not say they were exclusive,307 their benefits were “not . . . 
all-inclusive [or] complete,”308 and the Court’s Brooks decision had 
held that those benefits did not cut off service members’ rights under 
the FTCA.309  The plaintiffs disputed that allowing FTCA suits would 
disrupt military discipline, reasoning that “military personnel likely 
would be better disciplined . . . [with] knowledge that the 
Government had accorded them the right to recover for injuries 
negligently inflicted upon them,”310 that giving new rights and 
benefits to America’s World War II military personnel resulted in “the 
best disciplined [forces] this country has ever produced,”311 and that 
military discipline was adequately protected by the Articles of War 
and courts martial.312  Jefferson contested that civilian judges would 
have to evaluate military decisions, reasoning that “no military 
decision was involved in the performance of surgery.”313 
Responding to the argument that no American law allowed one 
member of the armed forces to sue another, Griggs generally 
conceded the point, but attributed it to a soldier’s immunity akin to 
intra-family immunity.314  Griggs then reasoned that the government 
was liable on a respondeat superior basis under the Restatement of 
Agency for such torts because, “although a servant acting in the 
course of his employment might not be liable to his wife or child by 
reason of his immunity, the master may nevertheless be held liable.”315  
Jefferson argued that military personnel were generally liable for torts 
at common law, noting a 1616 English case where one active duty 
                                                      
(No. 9) [hereinafter Pet’r Feres Reply Br.]; Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 12.  
 307. See Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 11 (“Unlike Workmen’s 
Compensation statutes, there is nothing in the veterans’ or servicemen’s benefit 
statutes providing for exclusiveness of remedy.”). 
 308. Pet’r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 19. 
 309. Id. at 20–21; Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 11; Resp’t Griggs Br., supra 
note 293, at 10–11. 
 310. Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16; accord Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 
293, at 19.  Feres’ attorneys took a different tack, arguing that military discipline 
considerations are not relevant to a soldier’s widow who should be able to sue just as 
a convict’s family could sue even though the convict is barred.  Pet’r Feres Br., supra 
note 293, at 18–19 (citations omitted). 
 311. Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. (citation omitted). 
 314. Resp’t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 21. 
 315. Id. at 21–22 (“A master or other principal is not liable for acts of a[n] . . . 
agent which the agent is privileged to do although the principal himself would not 
be so privileged, but he may be liable for an act as to which the agent has a personal 
immunity from suit.” (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 217(2) (1933)).  
The brief then quotes a comment to section 217:  “Thus if a servant while acting 
within the scope of employment negligently injures his wife, the master is subject to 
liability.”  Id. at 22 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 217 cmt. b (1933).  
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soldier sued another.316  Feres argued that “American Common Law 
did not refuse to recognize the right of a soldier to maintain an 
action against another soldier for acts arising while on duty,”317 but he 
cited only encyclopedia passages that did not address suits by service 
members for negligence.318 
B. The Feres Decision 
The common fact in Feres, Griggs, and Jefferson was that “each 
claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury 
due to negligence of others in the armed forces.”319  Justice Jackson, 
writing for the Court, squarely understood the issue to be one of 
“statutory construction”—“whether the Tort Claims Act extend[ed] 
its remedy to one sustaining ‘incident to the service’ what under 
other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.”320  No legislative 
history addressed this issue.321  This made the task of statutory 
interpretation difficult, a point the Court readily acknowledged.322   
The Court recognized arguments that favored liability, including:  
the FTCA granted district courts jurisdiction over negligence claims 
against the United States;323 the FTCA contemplated liability for the 
torts of service members acting within the line of duty;324 the FTCA 
did not include an exception barring suits by service members, 
although prior bills had;325 and, finally, Brooks allowed FTCA suits by 
service members and “it is argued that much of its reasoning is as apt 
to impose liability in favor of a man on duty as in favor of one on 
leave.”326  
                                                      
 316. See Pet’r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 12–13 (citing Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 
80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.); Hobart 134). 
 317. Pet’r Feres Reply Br., supra note 306, at 5. 
 318. Id. (citing and quoting 36 AM. JUR. Military § 119 (1941) (“An officer will, 
however, be liable to the soldiers under him for acting in an illegal and unauthorized 
manner toward them.”); 6 C.J.S. Army & Navy § 36 (1937) (“An officer is not 
answerable for an injury done within the scope of his authority, unless influenced by 
malice, corruption, or cruelty . . . .”)). 
 319. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. (stating that because no committee reports or floor debates disclosed 
what effect the statute was designed to have on the problem or even that Congress 
had the problem in mind, no conclusion was above challenge).   
 323. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1946)). 
 324. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (Supp. V 1946)). 
 325. See id. at 138–39 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)) 
(stating that all but two of the eighteen tort claims bills introduced in Congress 
between 1925 and 1935 expressly denied recovery to members of the armed forces 
but that the present Tort Claims Act made no exception). 
 326. Id. at 139.  The Court rejected this argument because “[t]he actual holding 
in the Brooks case [could] support liability here only by ignoring the vital distinction 
there stated.  The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the course of military 
duty.”  Id. at 146.  
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The Court determined that the FTCA “should be construed to fit, 
so far as will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system 
of remedies against the Government to make a workable, consistent 
and equitable whole.”327  It examined the history that led to passage of 
the FTCA, noting the expansion of the federal government and the 
corresponding increase in the number of “remediless wrongs” caused 
by government negligence, the growing number of private bills 
seeking compensation, the inadequacy and capriciousness of the 
Congressional claims process, and Congress’ prior legislation 
allowing certain types of claims.328  It stated: 
At last, in connection with the Reorganization Act, [Congress] 
waived immunity and transferred the burden of examining tort 
claims to the courts.  The primary purpose of the Act was to extend 
a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally 
benefited those already well provided for, it appears to have been 
unintentional.  Congress was suffering from no plague of private 
bills on the behalf of military and naval personnel, because a 
comprehensive system of relief had been authorized for them and 
their dependents by statute.329 
The Court acknowledged that the FTCA granted jurisdiction to 
decide tort cases, but noted, “it remain[ed] for courts, in exercise of 
their jurisdiction, to determine whether any claim [was] recognizable 
in law.”330  It found that the FTCA’s text provided “the test of 
allowable claims, which is, ‘The United States shall be liable . . . in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances . . . ,’ with certain exceptions not material here.”331  
It concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims did not meet this test because 
the “plaintiffs [could] point to no liability of a ‘private individual’ 
even remotely analogous to that which they [were] asserting against 
the United States.”332  No American precedent had allowed service 
members to sue the government or their officers for negligence, and 
no private person had power comparable to the federal government’s 
over its service members.333  The Court recognized that “if we 
consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the 
status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases we find 
analogous private liability,” but liability under the FTCA “is that 
                                                      
 327. Id. at 139. 
 328. Id. at 139–40. 
 329. Id. at 140. 
 330. Id. at 140–41 (“Looking to the detail of the Act . . .”); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 
510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994); infra note 462.  
 331. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. V 1946)).  
 332. Id. 
 333. See id. at 141–42. 
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created by ‘all the circumstances,’ not that which a few of the 
circumstances might create.”334  It concluded that no parallel private 
liability existed and “no new one has been created by . . . this Act.”335 
The opinion considered the “law of the place” requirement of § 
1346(b), through which the FTCA adopts the substantive tort law of 
the state where the tortious act took place.336  It noted that service 
members had no say over where they were posted, that workers’ 
compensation laws in “most states ha[d] abolished the common-law 
action for damages between employer and employee and superseded 
it with workman’s compensation statutes which provide[d], in most 
instances, the sole basis of liability,” and that state tort law varied 
widely as to liability, defenses, and damages.337  The Court concluded, 
“[i]t would hardly be a rational plan of providing for those disabled 
in service by others in service to leave them dependent upon 
geographic considerations over which they have no control and to 
laws which fluctuate in existence and value.”338   
The Court spoke to the “distinctively federal”339 relationship 
between the government and its service members, citing its three-
year-old Standard Oil Co.340 decision that barred the government from 
recovering the damages it incurred providing care to an injured 
soldier: 
 The considerations which [led] to [the Standard Oil Co.] decision 
apply with even greater force to this case:  “. . . To whatever extent 
state law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or 
others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal 
governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and 
consequences of the relation between persons in service and the 
Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and 
governed by federal authority.”341 
It observed that no federal law would allow a suit on these claims.342  
“The Military Personnel Claims Act . . . permitted recovery in some 
circumstances, but it specifically excluded claims of military 
personnel ‘incident to their service.’”343 
                                                      
 334. Id. at 142. 
 335. Id. 
 336. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1946)). 
 337. See id. at 142–43. 
 338. Id. at 143. 
 339. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 340. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).  See generally supra 
notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 341. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 305–06 (citing 
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885))).  
 342. Id. at 144 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946). 
 343. Id. 
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The Court turned to the “simple, certain, and uniform” 
compensation system Congress had created “for injuries or death of 
those in armed services.”344  After noting that the compensation 
system “requires no litigation,” and its “recoveries compare extremely 
favorably with those provided by most workman’s compensation 
statutes,” it recounted the substantial benefits given to Arthur 
Jefferson and Lt. Col. Griggs’ estate.345  The Court found significance 
in Congress’ failure to address the intersection of the uniform 
compensation system and the FTCA346: 
If Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to 
apply in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why it should have 
omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each 
other.  The absence of any such adjustment is persuasive that there 
was no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to permit 
recovery for injuries incident to military service.347 
The Court held without dissent that the FTCA did not provide a 
remedy for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries [arose] out of 
or [were] in the course of activity incident to service.”348  It noted that 
                                                      
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 145.  The Court noted that Jefferson had received $3,645.50 at the time 
of trial, and could expect to receive another $31,947, and that Mrs. Griggs could 
expect to receive over $22,000, which was $7,000 more than the maximum permitted 
for wrongful death in Illinois.  Id. 
 346. See id. at 144.  The Court set out four different possibilities:  “We might say 
that the claimant may (a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) elect which to pursue, 
thereby waiving the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the 
proceeds of the smaller, or (d) that the compensation and pension remedy excludes 
the tort remedy.”  Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 146 (Justice Douglas did not join the Court’s opinion but did concur in 
the result).  Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether a claim arose 
incident to service, with no single factor being dispositive.  See, e.g., Costo v. United 
States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001); Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652, 655 
(3d Cir. 1999).  These factors include the following: 
  (1) Whether the injury arose while a service member was on active duty.  
See Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 923–25 (2d Cir. 1982) (soldier shot 
by fellow soldier); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 226–27 (8th Cir. 
1966) (airman drowned in base swimming pool). 
  (2) Whether the injury arose on a military situs.  See Morey v. United 
States, 903 F.2d 880, 881–82 (1st Cir. 1990) (sailor fell off pier where his ship 
was docked); Millang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam) (off-duty marine run over by on-duty military police officer on 
military installation).  But see Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 852 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (ruling that the situs of the injury was not determinative). 
  (3) Whether the injury arose during a military activity.  See Costo, 248 F.3d 
at 864, 868 (sailors drowned while participating in Navy-led recreational 
rafting trip); Galligan v. City of Phila., 156 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473–74 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (West Point cadet injured while attending an Army-Navy football 
game).  
  (4) Whether the service member was taking advantage of a privilege or 
enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service.  See Rayner v. 
United States, 760 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (soldier 
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federal law defined the relationship between service members and 
the government, concluding that Congress had not authorized a new 
cause of action under varying state law for injuries or death of service 
members.349  The Court stated, “[w]e cannot impute to Congress such 
a radical departure from established law in the absence of express 
congressional command.”350  
C. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions related to the Feres Doctrine 
This section briefly summarizes the Supreme Court’s decisions that 
deal with the Feres doctrine and the related body of law declining to 
recognize constitutional torts arising from military relationships.  
This short review is provided to facilitate discussion of the criticisms 
that have been directed at the Feres decision. 
1. United States v. Brown 
In United States v. Brown,351 the Supreme Court held that Feres does 
not bar claims of veterans that arise after they have left military 
service.352  Noting that the veteran was injured in a Veterans’ 
Administration hospital seven years after his discharge, the Court 
explained that “[t]he injury . . . was not incurred while [Brown] was 
on active duty or subject to military discipline.  The injury occurred 
after his discharge, while he enjoyed a civilian status.”353  The Court 
concluded that this injury did not arise incident-to-service and was 
not barred by Feres.354  In reaching such a conclusion, the Court 
explained its Feres decision, stating: 
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his 
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on 
discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under 
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or 
                                                      
injured during elective surgery at military hospital); Herreman v. United 
States, 476 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1973) (National Guardsman passenger on 
military flight).  
  (5) Whether the injury arose while the service member was subject to 
military discipline or control.  See Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 
1222, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (soldier injured when ejected 
from on-base social club under the operational control of base commander); 
Stewart v. United States, 90 F.3d 102, 104–05 (4th Cir. 1996) (soldier injured 
in on-post automobile accident while returning to quarters after mandatory 
physical training). 
 349. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 350. Id.  
 351. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). 
 352. Id. at 113. 
 353. Id. at 112. 
 354. Id. at 113. 
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negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the 
Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character.355 
Justices Reed and Minton joined in Justice Black’s dissent.356 
2. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States 
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,357 the Court 
considered a third-party indemnity action against the United States 
brought by the manufacturer of an aircraft ejection system that 
injured a National Guard pilot.358  The issue was complicated by the 
holding in United States v. Yellow Cab Co.359 that the FTCA allows third 
party actions against the United States for indemnity and 
contribution.360  Because of the tension between Yellow Cab and Feres, 
the Court found it “necessary . . . to examine the rationale of Feres to 
determine . . . if . . . [Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.’s] claim would 
circumvent the purposes of the Act.”361  The Court recounted Feres’ 
point that the government’s relationship to its service members “is 
unlike any relationship between private individuals,” creating “at least 
a surface anomaly in applying” the FTCA’s private person liability 
requirement.362  It identified three rationales or factors for Feres’ 
conclusion that Congress had not intended to allow incident-to-
service claims: 
 First, the relationship between the Government and members of 
its Armed Forces is “‘distinctively federal in character’” . . . .  
Second, the Veterans’ Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for 
tort liability, a statutory “no fault” compensation scheme which 
provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard 
to any negligence attributable to the Government. . . .  
[T]hird[,] . . . the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to 
his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on 
discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under 
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or 
negligent acts committed in the course of military duty . . . .363 
                                                      
 355. Id. at 112. 
 356. Id. at 113 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black argued, “[w]e have previously 
held, I think correctly, that a soldier injured in a hospital cannot also sue for 
damages under the Tort Claims Act. . . .  To permit a veteran to recover damages . . . 
seems like an unjustifiable discrimination which the Act does not require.”  Id. at 
114. 
 357. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
 358. Id. at 667. 
 359. 340 U.S. 543 (1951). 
 360. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 669–70 (citing Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543, 
and explaining its holding). 
 361. Id. at 670. 
 362. Id. at 670–71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 
135, 141–42 (1950)). 
 363. Id. at 671–72 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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It then addressed each rationale.364  It concluded that “[t]he factors 
considered by the Feres court are largely applicable in this type of case 
as well,” and that suit was barred.365  
Justice Marshall filed a dissent, in which Justice Brennan 
concurred, stating:  “I cannot agree that that narrow, judicially 
created exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in 
the Act should be extended to any category of litigation other than 
suits against the Government by active-duty servicemen based on 
injuries incurred while on duty.”366 
3. Chappell v. Wallace 
In Chappell v. Wallace,367 the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
no cause of action existed under the Constitution for tort suits by 
service members against other service members.368  Five sailors alleged 
that seven of their superior officers had discriminated against them 
because of their race.369  The Court reasoned that a Constitutional 
cause of action will not be recognized when “‘special factors 
counseling hesitation’ are present,”370 and that “[t]he ‘special factors’ 
that bear on the propriety of respondents’ Bivens action also formed 
the basis of this Court’s decision in Feres.”371  These factors or 
rationales included “the unique relationship between the 
Government and military personnel,” the uniform compensation 
system, and the disruption such suits would have on military 
discipline.372  The Court declined to recognize a Constitutional cause 
of action under these circumstances because “‘special factors 
                                                      
 364. Id. at 672–73 (finding that the government-federal contractor relationship is 
federal, the military compensation system “provides an upper limit” to the 
government’s potential liability, and trial of the contractor’s suit would have the 
same effect on military discipline as a suit by the airman, involving second-guessing 
orders and testimony by service members about one another’s decisions). 
 365. Id. at 674. 
 366. Id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 367. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 368. Id. at 305. 
 369. Id. at 297. 
 370. Id. at 298 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). 
 371. Id.  
 372. Id. at 299.  The Court stated: 
As the Court has since recognized, “[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best 
explained by the ‘peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his 
superiors, [and] the effects on the maintenance of such suits on discipline . . 
. .’”  United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. 
Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). . . .  Although this case concerns the 
limitations on the type of non-statutory damages remedy recognized in 
Bivens, rather than Congress’ intent in enacting the [FTCA], the Court’s 
analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case. 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  
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counseling hesitation’ [were] present” in that Congress had 
appropriately regulated the military and the rights of service 
members,373 and “‘courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact 
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority 
might have.’”374 
4. United States v. Shearer 
In United States v. Shearer,375 the Supreme Court expanded the Feres 
doctrine to encompass situations other than claims that met the 
traditional incident-to-service test,376 holding that Feres barred an 
FTCA suit against the government for the off-base, off-duty murder of 
one service member by another, even though the government knew 
that the murderer had been convicted of a prior manslaughter 
overseas.377  The plaintiff alleged government negligence because 
“although the Army knew that [the murderer] was dangerous, it 
‘negligently and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient 
control over’ him and ‘failed to warn other persons that he was at 
large.’”378   
The Court reasoned that the crux of the Feres doctrine is the 
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the 
extreme results that might obtain if suits . . . were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty.”379  It concluded that the plaintiff’s allegation of 
negligent personnel practices relating to the murderer and the 
Army’s failure to warn others about him “[struck] at the core of these 
concerns.”380  Any suit would “call[] into question basic choices about 
the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman,” and require 
“commanding officers . . . to convince a civilian court of the wisdom 
                                                      
 373. Id. at 298, 302–04. 
 374. Id. at 305 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,  
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962)). 
 375. 473 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 376. See supra notes 365–369 (discussing incident-to-service test). 
 377. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 53–54, 59.  Shearer also addressed the FTCA’s assault and 
battery exception.  Id. at 54–57 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)).  That 
discussion is not relevant to this paper. 
 378. Id. at 54. 
 379. Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Muniz, 
374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 
(1954))). 
 380. Id. at 58.  The Court added in a footnote that, “[a]lthough no longer 
controlling, other factors mentioned in Feres are present here.  It would be 
anomalous for the Government’s duty to supervise servicemen to depend on the 
local law of the various states, and the record shows that Private Shearer’s 
dependents are entitled to statutory veterans’ benefits.”  Id. at 58 n.4 (citations 
omitted). 
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of a wide range of [‘complex, subtle, and professional’] military and 
disciplinary decisions.”381  The Court ruled that these claims, like 
those in Feres and Stencel, “were the type of claims that, if generally 
permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at 
the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.”382  It held that 
such claims were outside what Congress had authorized when it 
enacted the FTCA.383  The eight justices deciding the case concurred 
in the Court’s analysis of the Feres issue.384 
5. United States v. Johnson 
In United States v. Johnson,385 the Supreme Court held that the Feres 
doctrine barred a tort suit by members of the Coast Guard injured in 
a helicopter crash during a rescue mission although the tortfeasor, an 
FAA air traffic controller, was not a member of the military.386  
Rejecting an Eleventh Circuit test that provided “when negligence is 
alleged on the part of a Federal Government employee who is not a 
member of the military, . . . the propriety of a suit should be 
determined by examining the rationales that underlie the Feres 
doctrine,”387 the Court reaffirmed its Feres holding that the FTCA does 
not encompass claims “for injuries that [arose] out of or [were] in 
the course of activity incident to service.”388  It also rejected the 
argument that the civilian nature of the tortfeasor was relevant to that 
inquiry.389  The Court found that the three broad rationales for the 
Feres doctrine applied to the Johnson facts390:  the distinctively federal 
nature of the military relationship between service members and the 
government;391 the congressionally-established system of “generous 
statutory disability and death benefits”;392 and the disruption of 
military discipline and “commitment essential to effective service” 
that would flow from allowing tort suits by service members.393   
It noted that Johnson had been on a rescue mission as part of his 
                                                      
 381. Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
 382. Id. at 59. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See id. at 59–60 (Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in Part 
II-B regarding the Feres opinion, and Justice Marshall also concurred separately in 
Part II-B). 
 385. 481 U.S. 681 (1987). 
 386. Id. at 682–83, 692. 
 387. Id. at 684. 
 388. Id. at 686 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“This Court 
has never deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar.”). 
 389. Id. at 686–88. 
 390. Id. at 688. 
 391. Id. at 689 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (quoting United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947))). 
 392. Id. (citing UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMANAC (L. Sharff & S. Gordon eds., 1985)). 
 393. Id. at 690–91 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985)).   
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military service and in his military status, that his wife had received 
administrative compensation, and that any suit would likely raise 
military discipline issues.394  Accordingly, the case came “within the 
heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently ha[d] been articulated.”395 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in Justice Scalia’s 
dissent.396  Justice Scalia argued that, with the exception of the 
military discipline concern first noted in Brown, the Court had 
disavowed the rationales it had identified in support of the Feres 
decision, and that they did not justify the result.397  He argued that the 
“parallel private liability” rationale failed because it would render 
superfluous some explicit exceptions to the FTCA that involve purely 
federal activities, such as postal matters and combatant activities, and 
because the Court had subsequently rejected the “parallel private 
liability” requirement.398  He also criticized the second rationale, that 
claims arising within the distinctively federal military relationship 
should not be judged by state tort law.399  Justice Scalia reasoned it was 
more unfair to deny service members any recovery than it was to 
subject them to varying state laws; the purported “need for 
uniformity” was belied by allowing civilians, prisoners,400 and 
“servicemen . . . [injured] not incident to service” to sue; and “it 
[was] difficult to explain why uniformity . . . [was] indispensable for 
the military, but not for the many other federal departments and 
agencies.”401  He argued that the third rationale—the existence of a 
uniform compensation system—was undermined because the Court 
had allowed FTCA suits by veterans and service members for injuries 
that were not incurred incident to service even though both veterans 
and service members receive administrative compensation.402  He 
further noted that the Court had recognized that neither the 
Veterans Benefit Act nor the FTCA provided that remedies under the 
veterans’ statute were exclusive.403  Finally, Justice Scalia argued that 
                                                      
 394. Id. at 691–92. 
 395. Id. at 692. 
 396. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 397. Id. at 693–95. 
 398. Id. (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian 
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)). 
 399. Id. at 695–96. 
 400. Id. at 695–96 (“We have abandoned this peculiar rule of solicitude in 
allowing federal prisoners (who have no more control over their geographical 
location than servicemen) to recover under the FTCA for injuries caused by the 
negligence of prison authorities.” (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 
(1963))). 
 401. Id. (quoting Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 402. Id. at 697–98 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); United 
States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1951)). 
 403. Id. at 697 (citing Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53). 
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Feres’ attempt “to make ‘the entire statutory system of remedies 
against the Government . . . a workable, consistent and equitable 
whole,’” had failed,404 and that “‘[t]here [was] no justification for this 
Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by 
Congress.’”405 
6. United States v. Stanley 
In United States v. Stanley,406 a former soldier alleged that his 
constitutional rights were violated when he unwittingly participated 
in an LSD drug testing program during his military service.407  The 
Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Chappell that no constitutional tort 
remedy was available when a service member’s injury arose out of or 
in the course of activity incident-to-service, and clarified that the 
holding applied even though suit had been brought against 
government employees other than the plaintiff’s superior officers.408  
The same “‘special factors counseling hesitation [in Chappell]’—’the 
unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and 
Congress’ activity in the field,’” counseled hesitation in Stanley.409  The 
Court found “no reason” to adopt a different test for service 
members’ claims for constitutional torts than for FTCA suits.410  The 
Court held that Stanley had no constitutional cause of action because 
his claim arose incident to his military service.411  The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, did not address Stanley’s FTCA 
claims against the United States, other than to reject them on 
procedural grounds as not within the interlocutory order that was 
appealed to the circuit court.412   
                                                      
 404. Id. at 701 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950)). 
 405. Id. at 702 (quoting Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957)). 
 406. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 407. Id. at 671–72. 
 408. Id. at 680–81 (citations omitted). 
 409. Id. at 683–84 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)). 
 410. Id. at 681–83.  The Court stated: 
A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would 
call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require 
judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.  Whether a 
case implicates those concerns would often be problematic, raising the 
prospect of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military officers 
concerning the details of their military commands.  Even putting aside the 
risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which would becloud military 
decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at correct conclusions would 
disrupt the military regime.  The “incident to service” test, by contrast, 
provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with less 
extensive inquiry into military matters.  
Id. at 682–83. 
 411. Id. at 680. 
 412. Id. at 676–78.  Both dissents concurred in this result.  Id. at 686 n.1 (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 708 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
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Justice O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part.413  While 
agreeing that service members had no remedy for constitutional torts 
that arise incident to military service, she would have recognized a 
constitutional cause of action where “conduct of the type alleged in 
[Stanley was] so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a 
matter of law it simply cannot be considered a part of the military 
mission.”414 
Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justice Marshall 
and in part by Justice Stevens.415  Justice Brennan argued that the 
majority had inappropriately granted absolute immunity to the 
civilian officials who had violated Stanley’s rights,416 and improperly 
expanded the holding of Wallace v. Chappell.417  He urged, in the 
absence of a command relationship or clear showing that military 
discipline would be undermined,418 that no factor counseled 
hesitation to the recognition of a constitutional cause of action on 
these facts.419 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S FERES DECISION 
This Part analyzes the Feres decision and the criticisms directed at 
it.  It evaluates the Court’s reasoning and the factors that support its 
conclusion.  It then considers the criticisms of the opinion, including 
those that directly challenge the reasoning of Feres, and those that 
independently object to its analysis.  Finally, it addresses 
characterizations of the Feres decision as judicially creating an 
exception to the FTCA, usurping the role of Congress, and fostering 
injustice. 
A. Evaluating the Feres Conclusion 
The historical circumstances and the state of the law when 
Congress enacted the Legislative Reform Act of 1946 provide 
substantial support for Feres’ conclusion that Congress did not intend 
for the FTCA to cover claims arising from injuries to service-members 
incident-to-service.  The single issue before the Court in Feres was 
“whether the Tort Claims Act extend[ed] its remedy to one 
sustaining ‘incident to the service’ what under other circumstances 
                                                      
part and dissenting in part). 
 413. Id. at 708 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 414. Id. at 708–10. 
 415. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 416. Id. at 693–98. 
 417. Id. at 700–02. 
 418. Id. at 703–06. 
 419. Id. at 706–08. 
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would be an actionable wrong.”420  The Court approached its task with 
the stated purpose of deciding that issue in accordance with what 
Congress intended.421  The task was difficult because there was no 
definitive legislative history on the issue.422 
The Court laid out a strong affirmative case for the proposition 
that when Congress enacted the FTCA it did not intend to allow suit 
for injuries that were incurred incident to military service.  The 
opinion reviewed the “long effort” that led to the enactment of the 
FTCA.423  It recognized that a key purpose of the Act was to relieve 
Congress of the burden of private bills, but noted that private bills on 
behalf of service members were not a significant part of that 
problem.424  The Court explained that the courts are “to determine 
whether any claim is recognizable in law.”425  It noted that the text of 
the FTCA subjected the government to liability only “‘to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances,’”  and that no 
American precedent supported liability under circumstances akin to 
those of the government-service member relationship.426  The Court 
addressed the FTCA’s jurisdictional requirement that liability be 
assessed under the substantive state tort law of the place of the 
wrongful act, noted that state tort law and workers’ compensation law 
vary widely, and concluded that it would not have been rational to 
subject claims brought against the federal government by members of 
its military to such varied rules.427  The Court spoke to the 
“distinctively federal” relationship between the government and 
service members that is “fundamentally derived from federal sources 
and governed by federal authority,” and noted that federal law did 
not provide “a recovery such as plaintiffs seek” because the Military 
Personnel Claims Act “specifically excluded claims of military 
personnel ‘incident to their service.’”428  It addressed the “simple, 
certain, and uniform” compensation programs Congress had created 
for veterans and service members and reasoned that, had Congress 
intended for service members to recover under the FTCA, it would 
                                                      
 420. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
 421. Id. at 138, 146. 
 422. Id. at 138. 
 423. Id. at 139.  
 424. Id. at 140. 
 425. Id. at 141–42. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. at 142–43. 
 428. Id. at 143–44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,  
305–06 (1947) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. IV 1946); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 
487 (1885); Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871)). 
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have directed how a tort recovery would or would not alter the 
administrative remedy.429   
Although not mentioned in its opinion, the Feres Court was aware 
of a significant body of law that held that service members could not 
bring suit for in-service injuries under statutes that waived the United 
States’ tort sovereign immunity in specific circumstances.  Second 
Circuit decisions in 1928430 and 1945431 (the latter written by Judge 
Learned Hand) held that the Public Vessels Act did not authorize 
service members to sue for in-service injuries even though the 
language of the statute did not exclude such liability432:  
If it had been the purpose to change that policy as respects officers 
and seamen of the navy injured by the unseaworthiness of a public 
vessel, or by the fault of one another, because that is what in the 
end it comes to, we cannot think it would have been left to such 
general language . . . .433   
A similar line of cases barred suits seeking compensation for in-
service injuries to service members under the Railroad Control Act’s 
waiver of federal sovereign immunity.434  This body of law was 
presented to the Court in Feres435 and Brooks.436  The Court alluded to 
it in the Brooks opinion.437 
One other factor strongly supports the Court’s conclusion.  
Throughout the legislative build-up to the enactment of the FTCA, 
Congress had contemplated that any general tort claims bill would 
place caps or limits on the damages that could be recovered.  Many of 
the bills proposed in the 1920s and 1930s included maximum 
amounts to be paid.438  Up to the eve of the FTCA’s enactment, the 
                                                      
 429. Id. at 144–45. 
 430. Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 431. Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 432. Id. at 743; Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809. 
 433. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809. 
 434. See Sandoval v. Davis, 278 F. 968, 969–970 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff’d per curiam, 
288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923); Seidel v. Dir. Gen. of R.Rs., 89 So. 308 (La. 1921); Moon v. 
Hines, 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921). 
 435. U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 14–19. 
 436. U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60, at 6, 10–18. 
 437. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). 
 438. See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(a), 202(b) (1935) ($50,000 for property; $7500 
for personal injury or death); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(a)–(b), 201(a), 202(b) (1933) 
($50,000 for property; $7,500 for personal injury or death); H.R. 129, 73d Cong.  
§ 2(b)(1) (1933) ($50,000 for property; $10,000 for personal injury or death);  
S. 4567, 72d Cong. §§ 1(a)–(b), 201(a), 202(b) (1932) (same); S. 211, 72d Cong.  
§§ 1(a), (c), 201(a), 202(b) (1931) (same); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(a), (c), 
203(b)(3) (1931) ($50,000 for property; $10,000 for personal injury or death);  
H.R. 17168, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 201(a) (1931) ($50,000 for property; $7,500 for 
personal injury or death);  H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 21(a) (1931) (same); H.R. 
15428, 71st Cong. §§ 1(a), 201(a), 202(a) (1930) (same); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(a), 
(201)(a), 202(a) (1930) (same); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 4, 201(a), 202(a) (1928) 
($10,000 for property; $7,500 for personal injury or death); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 2, 
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legislative proposals of the 1940s limited damages to $7,500 or 
$10,000.439  President Roosevelt’s 1942 proposal included a limit of 
$7,500.440  Payments under the military compensation system were 
substantially higher than these limits.441  Because it had already 
provided service members with an assured, no-fault administrative 
remedy that was larger than the tort remedy under consideration, it is 
unlikely that Congress intended to allow service members to also 
pursue a tort remedy under the FTCA. 
On the face of its opinion and unanimous holding, the Court 
made a compelling explanation why “Congress, in drafting this Act, 
[had not] created a new cause of action dependent on local law for 
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.”442  It could 
not “impute to Congress such a radical departure from established 
law in the absence of express congressional command.”443  The Court 
correctly found that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to allow 
service members to sue for injuries that arose incident to military 
service.444  
B. Arguments Against the Feres Decision 
Opponents of Feres raise a number of criticisms of the decision.445  
Some directly attack the Court’s explanation.  Others raise 
independent reasons why the Court must be considered mistaken.  A 
third set characterizes the decision in pejorative terms. 
                                                      
3 (1926) ($5,000 for property and personal injury or death); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. 
§§ 4, 204(a)(5), 204(b)(3) (1926) ($10,000 for property; $5,000 for total disability or 
death); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 5 (1925) ($5000 for personal injury or death).  
Four bills of that era did not cap damages.  See H.R. 2028, 74th Cong. (1935);  
H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong. 
(1925). 
 439. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 2 ($7,500); 
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 4 (1945) ($10,000); S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 2, 6 (1942) 
($10,000); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4 (1940) ($7,500). 
 440. See H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 2 (1942) ($7,500).   
 441. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950) (noting that Arthur 
Jefferson had received $3,645 in government benefits prior to trial and could expect 
to receive another $31,947, and that Mrs. Griggs could expect to receive over $22,000 
in government benefits); S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 1–3 (1948) (noting monthly 
payments of $168 made to Lee Jones Cardy’s wife and mother following his 1944 
death). 
 442. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 443. See id.  Justice Douglas concurred in the result.   
 444. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, §§ 1-5A, 5A.05 (“There is little 
evidence that Feres incorrectly determined Congressional intent on the matter . . . .”); 
see also Gregory C. Sisk, Teaching Litigation with the Federal Government, 49 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 275, 287 (1999) (arguing that “the Feres Court was probably correct [fifty years 
ago] in divining the mood of the times, confirming . . . that era’s [deference] toward 
military demands and the military command structure, and recognizing that 
Congress very likely would have excepted military personnel from the [Act] . . . had 
it anticipated . . . such claims”). 
 445. This article responds to those arguments that are most prominent or recent. 
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1. Direct Challenges to  Feres’ Line of Analysis 
a. The FTCA Requires Comparable Private Person Parallel Liability 
In Feres the Court concluded, “plaintiffs can point to no liability of 
a ‘private individual’ even remotely analogous to that which they are 
asserting against the United States.”446  This conclusion has been 
challenged on the ground that the military does things that private 
individuals do, and “[a]pplying the Court’s logic, because private 
entities can be held liable for negligent provision of medical, legal, 
retail, transportation, and recreational services, the United States 
could, similarly, be liable for the negligent provision of such 
services.”447  This argument falls into the logical trap of finding 
“analogous private liability” by considering only some circumstances 
and ignoring “the status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer.”448  
The Court addressed and rejected this argument because liability 
under the FTCA “is that created by ‘all the circumstances,’ not that 
which a few of the circumstances might create.”449  Tort liability often 
turns on the particular relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.450 
In his Johnson dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Feres was mistaken 
to recognize an FTCA parallel private liability requirement.451  First, 
he argued such a requirement would mean that some of the FTCA’s 
exceptions were “superfluous, since private individuals typically do 
not, for example, transmit postal matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), collect 
taxes or customs duties, § 2680(c), impose quarantines, § 2680(f), or 
regulate the monetary system, § 2680(i).”452  Second, he argued the 
Court had subsequently rejected any “‘parallel private liability’ 
requirement.”453   
The former argument fails because the FTCA does include 
redundant defenses.  For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) bars claims 
                                                      
 446. 340 U.S. at 141. 
 447. Dierdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine,  
192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2007).  
 448. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142. 
 449. Id.  
 450. See, e.g., Matheny v. United States, 469 F.3d 1093, 1094–95 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that the Indiana Recreational Use Statute foreclosed recovery by a visitor 
injured while sled-riding in a national park); Leigh v. NASA, 860 F.2d 652, 652–53 
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Louisiana statutory employer doctrine barred suit 
by employee of a subcontractor injured while testing an external tank of the space 
shuttle). 
 451. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694–95 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), (c), (f), (i) (1982)).   
 452. See id. at 694. 
 453. Id. at 694–95 (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957); 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)). 
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arising from both “misrepresentation” and “deceit,” and the 
discretionary function exception of § 2680(a) would bar any claim 
arising from either “the imposition . . . of a quarantine,” protected by 
§ 2680(f), or “the regulation of the monetary system,” protected by  
§ 2680(i).454  Nor was it irrational for Congress to include overlapping 
defenses.455   
The latter argument fails because the “private person” liability 
requirement is a textual part of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the FTCA’s 
jurisdictional grant.456  As the Court recognized in Feres, one of its 
tasks was to determine whether a “claim is recognizable in law.”457  In 
FDIC v. Meyer,458 the Court analyzed the language of the jurisdictional 
grant in very similar terms: 
 Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction 
over a certain category of claims for which the United States has 
waived its sovereign immunity and “render[ed]” itself liable.  
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 . . . (1962).  This category 
includes claims that are:  
 “[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, . . .  
[3] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death  
[4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government [5] while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment, [6] under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred.”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
 A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant—and thus is 
“cognizable” under § 1346(b)—if it is actionable under § 1346(b).  
And a claim is actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six 
elements outlined above.459 
Thus, private person liability is an element of any FTCA claim.460  
Where a private person might perform the same task, that 
                                                      
 454. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (f), (h), (i) (2006). 
 455. Certainly the Postal Exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2006), is not 
superfluous when juxtaposed with the private person liability requirement.  The 
government is still liable for negligently leaving mail in a hazardous spot.  See Dolan 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 489–92 (2006). 
 456. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 457. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).   
 458. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 459. Id. at 477 (alterations in original). 
 460. See id. at 477–78 (holding that § 1346(b) does not waive sovereign immunity 
for constitutional tort claims because “federal law, not state law, provides the source 
of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right”);  
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 5 (1945); see also United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 
(2005) (recognizing that § 1346(b)(1) waives sovereign immunity under 
circumstances where the United States if a private person, rather than the United 
States if a state or municipal entity, would be liable and that the Court had 
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requirement can be met.461  But where an activity is not something a 
private person could do, the requirement for private person liability 
cannot be met and the claim is not cognizable under the FTCA.462  
Finally, some critics have asserted that the Court erred in 
discussing private person liability by “ignor[ing] other provisions of 
the FTCA . . . which opened to liability a number of areas where 
parallel private rights of action did not previously exist, including the 
‘transmi[ssion of] postal matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), collect[ion of] 
taxes or custom duties, § 2680(c), impos[ition of] quarantines,  
§ 2680(f), [and regulation of] the monetary system, § 2680(i).’”463  
This assertion is apparently based on a misreading of Justice Scalia’s 
argument that a private person liability requirement would render 
some of the FTCA’s exceptions superfluous because they protected 
purely governmental activity.464  The cited provisions, 28 U.S.C.  
§§ 2680(b), (c), (f), and (i) are exceptions to the FTCA’s general 
                                                      
consistently adhered to the private person standard).  See generally Laird v. Nelms, 406 
U.S. 797 (1972) (citing § 1346(b)) (holding that because the jurisdictional grant is 
for claims for a “negligent or wrongful act or omission,” claims for strict or absolute 
liability cannot be brought under the FTCA)); Peak v. Small Bus. Admin., 660 F.2d 
375, 378 (8th Cir. 1981) (“The holding in Laird did not indicate that such claims are 
not governed by the provisions of the FTCA, but simply that they are barred by the 
provisions of the FTCA. The practical effect . . . is the same as if Congress had 
included it as an exemption under section 2680.”).  
 461. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 315, 319 (1957) (negligence 
by people fighting forest fire); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,  
61–62, 66–69 (1955) (failure to keep lighthouse repaired). 
 462.  C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 34, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) (barring 
suit challenging ban on formaldehyde-emitting foam insulation and stating that the 
plain meaning of § 1346(b) is that the United States cannot be held liable if there is 
no comparable cause of action against a private citizen); Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United 
States, 721 F.2d 385, 387, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of suit by pajama 
manufacturers challenging ban on flame retardant because a quasi-legislative or 
quasi-adjudicative action by an agency of the federal government is not the type of 
action that private persons could engage in); Pate v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 
62, 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2004) (barring suit alleging U.S. Parole Commission failed to hold 
hearings in conformity with its regulations); see also Dorking Genetics v. United 
States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1264 (2d Cir. 1996) (barring suit alleging government failure to 
stop export of diseased cattle and holding that the breach of such a duty, assuming it 
existed, is not cognizable under the FTCA); Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 
753 F.2d 1151, 1152–55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (barring suit alleging that the General 
Services Administration failed to follow government regulations when it debarred 
plaintiff from federal contracts). 
 463. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 
694 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Turley, supra note 9, at 16 (noting the 
same examples and stating that “[w]hile the Feres Court relied on the fact that there 
was no parallel private right of action where service members could sue their 
employer, ‘[t]his ignores other provisions of the FTCA . . . which opened to liability a 
number of areas where parallel private rights of action did not previously exist’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Costo, 248 F.3d at 874)). 
 464. Johnson v. United States, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (b), (c), (f), (i) (1982)).   
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waiver of sovereign immunity.465  As such, they do the opposite of 
opening the United States to liability for transmitting postal matter, 
collecting taxes, imposing quarantines, or regulating the monetary 
system:  they exclude such claims from the FTCA. 
b. State Law and the Federal Relationship between Service Members 
and the United States 
Feres supported its conclusion that Congress did not intend to 
include claims arising incident-to-service by noting that “[i]t would 
hardly be a rational plan” to have claims of service members decided 
under widely varying state law, as the FTCA would require, when the 
relationship between service members and the government was 
“distinctively federal.”466  In response it is argued that the FTCA itself 
burdens the military relationship with state tort law:  
 State law . . . intrudes upon the relationship between the 
Government and its armed forces [because] when civilians sue . . . 
for injuries inflicted by . . . service members[,] [s]tate law . . . 
provid[es] the substantive tort law to establish the United States’ 
[FTCA] liability for its employees’ actions. . . . Civilians sue under 
the [FTCA] and, as a result, . . . service members face tort liability.  
Because tort law varies from state to state, this can lead to varying 
tort standards for  . . . service members.467 
This argument fails for three reasons.  First, service members would 
not face tort liability because the FTCA specifically grants immunity 
to all federal employees for any tort that is cognizable under the 
Act.468  Second, leaving aside the service members’ immunity, in an 
FTCA suit for service member negligence, the service member and 
the United States would both be on the defense side, with no strain 
on their relationship caused by varying state tort law.  Third, the 
argument does not address the Court’s point:  absent some strong 
indication to the contrary, it is unlikely that Congress would have set 
up a system where similar members of the military exposed to the 
                                                      
 465. Section 2680 begins, “Exceptions:  The provisions of this chapter and section 
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006). 
 466. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950) (quoting United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).  The Court reasoned: 
That the geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his 
tort claims makes no sense.  We cannot ignore the fact that most states have 
abolished the common-law action for damages between employer and 
employee and superseded it with workman’s compensation statutes which 
provide, in most instances, the sole basis of liability. 
Id.  
 467. Brou, supra note 447, at 40–41. 
 468. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). 
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same danger and suffering similar injuries would receive widely 
varying remedies under state tort law.469   
Justice Scalia argues: 
 [I]t is difficult to explain why uniformity (assuming our rule 
were achieving it) is indispensable for the military, but not for the 
many other federal departments and agencies that can be sued 
under the FTCA for the negligent performance of their “unique, 
nationwide function[s],” . . . including, as we have noted, the 
federal prison system which may be sued under varying state laws 
by its inmates.470  
The answer is that the military needs to be a cohesive organization to 
a much greater extent than other federal agencies and in a 
categorically different way than the Bureau of Prisons:  “The military 
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline 
from that of the civilian.”471  Trust and goodwill among soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen are important to military success.472 
A uniform system of remedies fosters trust and goodwill.  The 
FTCA bars claims that arise in foreign countries473 or in combatant 
activities.474  If three service-member amputees share a military 
hospital ward—one having lost a leg when his helicopter was shot 
down by the Taliban, one suffering the same loss in a military 
transport accident in Germany, and one in a military training flight 
in Kansas—each of them will have the full panoply of service 
members’ and veterans’ benefits.475  Those who suffered their loss in 
                                                      
 469. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142–44.  In Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 
(9th Cir. 1985), the court held that state law determines whether the government 
owed a duty to inform a former soldier that he had been exposed to radiation with 
thousands of others during service, assuming that the government had no notice that 
radiation was hazardous prior to his discharge.  Id. at 1019–20.  Because the service 
member was domiciled in California after discharge, the court determined that 
California law would apply to claims regarding his injury.  Id. at 1020. 
 470. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 696 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Stencel Aero 
Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see 
also Brou, supra note 447, at 41–42.  But see United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 
(1966) (holding federal prisoner could not sue under the FTCA for injuries incurred 
working for Prison Industries, Inc.). 
 471. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953); see also United States v. Stanley, 
483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (“We found ‘factors counseling hesitation’ in ‘[t]he need 
for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need 
and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice . . . .’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983))). 
 472. See Kathryn R. Burke, The Privacy Penumbra and Adultery:  Does Military Necessity 
Justify an Adultery Regulation and What Will It Take for the Court to Declare It 
Unconstitutional?, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 301, 321 (1997); Sam Nunn, The 
Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence in Military Cases, ARMY LAW. 
Jan. 1995, at 27, 28–30.  
 473. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006). 
 474. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006). 
 475. See discussion supra Part I.B(1). 
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combat or overseas could not sue under the FTCA because the Act’s 
exceptions bar those claims.476  If the one injured in Kansas could 
bring a FTCA suit under Kansas tort law he would have a much larger 
potential remedy, the others would know it, and may well feel unfairly 
treated.477  Concern about providing such disparate treatment for 
similarly situated members of the military led President Truman to 
veto the Cardy private relief bill on the day he signed the FTCA into 
law, stating that “it would grant to the estate a special benefit denied 
to the estates of other members of the armed forces where the facts 
are similar.”478  As President Eisenhower stated in a similar veto 
message, “[u]niformity and equality of treatment to all who are 
similarly situated must be the steadfast rule if the Federal programs 
for veterans and their dependents are to be operated successfully.”479  
This is why the Court thought it unlikely Congress would sub silentio 
create a new, non-uniform remedy for those injured incident-to-
service.480 
                                                      
 476. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), (k) (“The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not 
apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military . . . or 
 . . . [a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.”). 
 477. See Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine:  Here 
Today—Gone Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (“[A]bolishing Feres would 
splinter military cohesion by creating a privileged class of claimants who could bring 
suit, and an underprivileged class who would still be barred by the combat, foreign 
country, and discretionary function exceptions.”).  See generally United States v. 
Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 844 (4th Cir. 1948) (hypothesizing the disparate treatment 
that similarly-situated soldiers might nonetheless receive under the FTCA), rev’d, 337 
U.S. 49 (1949).  
 478. S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 2–3 (1948) (returning without approval the bill 
entitled “An Act for the Relief of the Estate of Lee Jones Cardy”); see supra notes  
125–29 (discussing vetoes of military private bills).   
 479. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-432, at 1–2 (1954) (returning without approval a bill for 
the relief of Mrs. Josette L. St. Marie); see also H.R. DOC. NO. 83-426, at 1–2 (1954) 
(returning without approval a bill for the relief of Theodor W. Carlson). 
 480. One of the lessons of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is that 
providing different, individualized awards to members of a group who have suffered 
similar loss can cause frustration and ill-will: 
[T]here are serious problems posed by a statutory approach mandating 
individualized awards for each eligible claimant.  The statutory mandate of 
tailored awards fueled divisiveness among claimants and undercut the very 
cohesion and united national response reflected in the Act.  The fireman’s 
widow would complain:  “Why am I receiving less money than the 
stockbroker’s widow?  My husband died a hero.  Why are you demeaning the 
value of his life?” . . .  The statutory requirement that each individual 
claimant’s award reflect unique financial and family circumstances inevitably 
resulted in finger-pointing and a sense among many claimants that the life of 
their loved one had been demeaned and undervalued relative to others also 
receiving compensation from the Fund. 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 82 (2008) 
(noting that a better approach might have been to provide the same amount for all 
eligible claimants); accord KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?  THE 
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 71–73 (2005) 
(describing his encounters with the 9/11 families at town meetings and their 
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c. The Military Compensation System & The Federal Tort Claims Act  
The Feres Court found it significant that Congress, having 
“provide[d] systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation 
for injuries or death of those in armed services,” failed to state how 
money received administratively would be taken into account if a 
service member received an FTCA judgment.481  The Court 
recognized four possible approaches Congress could have adopted.482  
It concluded that “[t]he absence of any such adjustment is persuasive 
that there was no [Congressional] awareness that the Act might be 
interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to military 
service.”483   
Critics have faulted this conclusion, arguing that the Feres bar of 
claims arising “incident-to-service” is much broader than the workers’ 
compensation laws’ bar to suits by “employees injured in accidents 
that arise out of and in the course of employment,”484 and that 
“veterans benefits are not as generous as the Court believed them to 
be.”485  The first argument presumes that the rights of civilians and 
service members to sue their employers should be parallel even 
though their work connection requirements for receiving benefits are 
categorically different:  one compensating injuries arising during 
“course of employment” and the other granting benefits for injuries 
arising during period of service.486  The second argument presents 
                                                      
reactions of resentment, anger, and disbelief when “faced with the raw truth that 
each claimant would receive a different award depending on the economic 
wherewithal of the victim” because “[w]idows of firefighters and military men . . . 
[were] receiv[ing] less from the fund than the stockbrokers’ widows”).   
 481. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). 
 482. Id.  The Court noted that a claimant might “(a) enjoy both types of recovery, 
or (b) elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting 
the larger liability with the proceeds of the smaller, or (d) that the compensation 
and pension remedy excludes the tort remedy.”  Id.   
 483. Id.  The Court then noted that the compensation system compared favorably 
to “most workman’s compensation statutes” and stated the administrative payments 
made to Jefferson and Griggs.  Id. at 145. 
 484. Brou, supra note 447, at 51; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 
698 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[r]ecovery is possible under 
workers’ compensation statutes more often than under the [Veterans’ Benefit Act],” 
and that “[Veterans’ Benefit Act] benefits can be terminated more easily than can 
workers’ compensation” benefits); Turley, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that unlike 
the Feres doctrine which bars suit in non-work related areas, FECA’s exclusive remedy 
is confined to work-related injuries or illnesses and does not bar suits for injuries 
caused by government negligence outside the employment context). 
 485. Brou, supra note 447, at 48. 
 486. See Brou, supra note 447, at 52–53 (touching upon the breadth of military 
medical coverage).  Unlike typical workers’ compensation statutes, benefits are 
provided to veterans and service members for any injury, disability, or death that 
arises at any time during their period of service, with few exceptions.  See supra Part 
II.B.1 (identifying the origin and scope of the military’s uniform compensation 
system).  The liberal standard is reflected in the title to the Congressional Act of 
September 27, 1944, which expanded the scope of the benefits program:  “To repeal 
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one side of an interminable debate.487  Neither argument addresses 
the Court’s reasoning that if Congress had anticipated that service 
members could recover under the FTCA it would have given 
direction about how moneys received from the two remedies would 
be adjusted.488 
Justice Scalia argues that “the [Veterans Benefits Act] is not, as Feres 
assumed, identical to federal and state workers’ compensation 
statutes” because they almost invariably contain “exclusivity 
provisions” which the veterans statutes do not.489  But the Court held 
in United States v. Demko490 that the Prison Industries Fund was the 
exclusive remedy for federal prisoners injured while working for 
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., even though that statute does not 
contain exclusivity language.491  The statute was enacted in 1934 and 
its legislative history does not address the exclusivity issue.492  The 
Court recognized that “compensation laws are practically always 
thought of as substitutes for, not supplements to, common-law tort 
actions.”493  It distinguished its Muniz decision because unlike the 
prisoner plaintiffs there, plaintiff Demko was “injured . . . in the 
                                                      
[the statute], which provides for the forfeiture of pay of persons in the military and 
naval service . . . who are absent from duty on account of the direct effects of 
venereal disease due to misconduct . . . .”  Act of September 27, 1944, Pub. L. No.  
78-430, 58 Stat. 752.   
 487. Resolving the “generousness” argument would likely turn on the definition 
chosen.  Certainly, however, there are two sides to be considered.  Compare Brou, 
supra note 447, at 48–51 (arguing that the scope of veterans’ benefits is limited when 
compared to the recoveries available in typical personal injury cases), with 
Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 477, at 11–14 (endorsing the overall equity 
associated with veterans’ benefits), and Joanne M. Bernott, United States v. Johnson:  
The Dissent’s Flawed Attack on Feres v. United States, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 109, 126 
(1987) (arguing that criticisms of the exclusive nature of the administrative remedies 
“carelessly impugn[] the overall adequacy of the military’s statutory compensation 
scheme”).  Any weighing of the generousness of veterans’ benefits would need to 
consider the broad range of benefits, preferences and perquisites available to 
veterans but not part of workers’ compensation systems.  See supra Part I.B.1 
(identifying the origins and scope of the military’s uniform compensation system).  
These include “educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-buying loan 
benefits, and retirement benefits.”  Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 n.10 (1987).  
 488. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.  Jayson & Longstreth note: 
Since the turn of the century, most tort remedies against employers for work-
related injuries have been eliminated, with an administrative compensation 
scheme substituted in their place. . . . It would certainly be strange to 
conclude that Congress intended that servicemen, virtually alone among 
American workers, be given free rein to sue their employer.   
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 5A.05. 
 489. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 490. 385 U.S. 149 (1966). 
 491. Id. at 151–52.  Federal Prison Industries, Inc. is the federal corporation  
that provides training and rehabilitation programs for prisoners.  18 U.S.C. § 4126 
(2006).   
 492. Denko, 385 U.S. at 152.   
 493. Id. at 151.   
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performance of an assigned prison task” and “is protected by the 
prison compensation law.”494  Accordingly, that law was his exclusive 
remedy, precluding his FTCA suit.495 
Justice Scalia also argues that “both before and after Feres we 
permitted injured servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they 
had been compensated under the [Veterans Benefit Act].”496  He pointedly 
observes that “the [Veterans Benefit Act] will in fact be exclusive for 
service-connected injuries, but not for others,” and suggests that the 
tension cannot be resolved from the texts of the statutes.497  This 
tension was recognized by the judges that dealt with the Feres 
litigation.498  It hardly shows that Feres is wrong.   
Nowhere in his dissent does Justice Scalia directly address or 
acknowledge the Feres Court’s core analysis on the compensation 
issue.  The absence from the FTCA of any “statutory authority” one 
way or another directing how tort judgments and money paid 
administratively are to be reconciled suggests that Congress was not 
“aware[] that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for 
injuries incident to military service.”499   
Some of the confusion surrounding the compensation issue is 
attributable to the Court.  Over time, the Court has been imprecise in 
describing Feres’ analysis of the compensation issue.  The Feres 
reasoning about the “simple, certain, and uniform” military 
compensation system500 is that, had Congress contemplated that the 
FTCA would apply to incident-to-service claims, “it is difficult to see 
why it should have omitted any provision to adjust these two types of 
remedy to each other.”501  In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp., this 
“adjustment” point was lost; the Court stated only that “the Veterans’ 
                                                      
 494. Id. at 149, 153.   
 495. Id. at 154.   
 496. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1954); Brooks v. United States,  
337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949)). 
 497. Id. at 698.   
 498. See infra Part IV.B.3.c. 
 499. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).  Justice Scalia’s Johnson 
dissent has received its own criticism: 
The dissent’s case against Feres fails because it does not directly address the 
plain meaning of Sections 1346(b) and 2674; does not address Justice 
Jackson’s syllogistic inquiry into the Congressional intent behind the FTCA; 
relies nearly exclusively on post-Feres case law to undermine a statutory 
interpretation premised on the statute’s text and legislative history; turns on 
an ill-considered proclamation about the legal mores of 1946; and too 
casually repudiates almost forty years of Congressional tolerance and 
expansion of the Feres doctrine.   
Bernott, supra note 487, at 135. 
 500. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.   
 501. Id.   
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Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability, a statutory ‘no 
fault’ compensation scheme which provides generous pensions to 
injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence attributable to 
the Government.”502  In Shearer, the point was reduced to a footnote:  
“Although no longer controlling, other factors mentioned in Feres are 
present here. . . .  [T]he record shows that Private Shearer’s 
dependents are entitled to statutory veterans’ benefits.”503  In Johnson 
the point was accurately presented again: 
 The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress 
would have provided such a comprehensive system of benefits 
while at the same time contemplating recovery for service-related 
injuries under the FTCA.  Particularly persuasive was the fact that 
Congress “omitted any provision to adjust these two types of 
remedy to each other.”504   
2. Other Challenges to the Feres Conclusion 
a. Language in Earlier Tort Claims Bills 
When it laid out the “considerations persuasive of liability,”505 the 
Feres Court noted that “eighteen tort claims bills were introduced in 
Congress between 1925 and 1935 and all but two expressly denied 
recovery to members of the armed forces; but the bill enacted as the 
present Tort Claims Act from its introduction made no exception.”506  
Many critics have argued that this piece of information undermines 
Feres’ holding:  “The omission of such a bar, when one was considered 
and rejected in sixteen previous tort bills, clearly indicates that 
Congress did not intend to limit service members’ ability to sue 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.”507 
There are three problems with this argument.  First, it ignores the 
substantial time gap between when the cited bills were considered—
the last was in 1935—and passage of the FTCA more than a decade 
                                                      
 502. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977).   
 503. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 
144–45).   
 504. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 (1987) (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 
144).   
 505. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138. 
 506. Id. at 139 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)).  The 
Court’s comment that “the bill enacted . . . made no exception” refers to S. 2177, 
79th Cong. tit. IV (1946). 
 507. Brou, supra note 447, at 37; see, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 
n. 1(9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 138–39, and 
asserting “that all but two of the eighteen drafts of the FTCA considered by Congress 
barred suits by members of the military”); Turley, supra note 9, at 16 n.105 (stating 
that “sixteen of the eighteen drafts of the FTCA contained a prohibition on suits by 
service members, a position rejected in the final legislation.”).   
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later.508  The cited bills are not contemporaneous with the FTCA’s 
enactment and, therefore, are suspect as a reflection of 
Congressional intent in 1946.509   
Second, the bills were very different from the FTCA as it was finally 
enacted.  Six of them provided only administrative remedies for 
personal injury or wrongful death claims, with no recourse to the 
courts.510  Eight called for administrative proceedings before the 
General Accounting Office or an Employees Compensation 
Commission, coupled with a right to review in the Court of Claims.511  
Fourteen of them had different procedures for property claims than 
for claims involving personal injury or death.512  Fourteen placed caps 
on the amount of damages that might be recovered.513  
Only three of the eighteen bills granted subject matter jurisdiction 
to United States district courts, and they bear very little resemblance 
                                                      
 508. Brou states that “[b]etween 1942 and the passage of the [FTCA] in 1946, 
Congress considered eighteen tort claims bills.”  Brou, supra note 447, at 37.  But the 
eighteen bills cited in her supporting footnote are the same ones cited in Brooks and 
are dated from 1925 to 1935.  Compare id. at 37 n.261, with Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51 n.2.   
 509. See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 27, 67 (2002) (acknowledging the usefulness of legislative history in 
clarifying ambiguous statutory issues, but qualifying this acknowledgment by stating 
that only contemporaneous legislative history should be used in the aid of statutory 
interpretation because pre-enactment legislative history is suspect); see also id. at  
66–67, (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 497 n.3 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (supporting a general proposition that pre-enactment 
legislative history is suspect).  In Cowart, Justice Blackmun questioned the use of 
legislative history from predecessor bills considered three years prior to the 
enactment of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments 
of 1984.  505 U.S. at 497 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
 510. See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 1(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 201–209 
(1930); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 201–209 (1928); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. §§ 201–213 
(1926); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1926); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 2 (1925). 
 511. See S. 1043, 74th Cong. § 304 (1935); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. §§ 11–12, 14–15 
(1933); S. 1833, 73d Cong. § 304 (1933) (providing that any insurance available to 
claimant be deducted from the damages to be paid by government); S. 4567, 72d 
Cong. § 304 (1932) (same); S. 211, 72d Cong. § 303 (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. § 
303 (1931); H.R. 17168, 71st Cong. §§ 303, 307 (1931) (“[T]he findings of the 
Comptroller General shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”); H.R. 
16429, 71st Cong. §§ 33, 37 (1931) (same). 
 512. See S. 1043 (providing different procedures and limitations for property 
damage claims than those for personal injury claims)); S. 1833, 73d Cong. (1933) 
(same); S. 4567 (same); S. 211, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) (same); H.R. 5065, 72d 
Cong. (1931) (same); H.R. 17168 (1931) (same); H.R. 16429 (same); H.R. 15428 
(conferring authority upon the Court of Claims to review on certiorari any settlements 
made under the provisions of the title, but limited the record on review to  
“a transcript of all the papers filed . . . prior to [the] settlement, together with . . . the 
decision of the Comptroller General”); S. 4377 (same) ; H.R. 9285 (same); H.R. 6716 
(same); S. 1912 (providing no provision for personal injury or death); H.R. 12179, 
68th Cong. (1925) (providing no provision for property damage); H.R. 12178 
(providing no provision for property damage). 
 513. See supra notes 438–40 and accompanying text (discussing the use of damage 
caps in pre-FTCA bills). 
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to the FTCA as it was enacted.514  They are much shorter than the 
FTCA, having lengths of 100 lines,515 fifty lines,516 and fifty-one lines,517 
compared to the FTCA’s 307 lines.518  None of the three contained a 
detailed jurisdictional grant comparable to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).519  
None contained any of the exceptions included in § 2680 of the 
FTCA,520 although two included provisions that would bar claims by 
service members.521  Because the eighteen cited bills are so different 
from the FTCA, the absence of some of their provisions from its final 
version does not demonstrate Congressional intent.522 
The third reason to reject the inference of Congressional intent 
from the absence of an explicit FTCA exception for service members 
is that such an exception was unnecessary in the first place.  Judge 
Augustus Hand explained three key points in the Second Circuit’s 
Feres opinion:  (1) service members could not recover for injuries 
incurred incident-to-service under the Military Personnel Claims 
Act;523 (2) law established by Dobson and Bradey before enactment of 
the FTCA barred suit for such injuries;524 and (3) the World War 
Veterans’ Act of 1924 had been amended to state that when it 
provided compensation, “‘no other pension laws or laws providing for 
gratuities or payments in the event of death in the service’ shall be 
applicable to disabilities or deaths made compensable under the 
Act.”525  Accordingly, “the explanation for the omission of the 
thirteenth exception to the Tort Claims Act is that it was considered 
unnecessary.”526   
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit was apparently persuaded 
by Judge Hand’s analysis.  In his dissent from the Fourth Circuit’s 
Brooks decision, Judge Parker noted that the proposed exception in 
H.R. 181 would have barred, “‘[a]ny claim for which compensation is 
                                                      
 514. See H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. § 2 (1934) (requiring pre-suit certificate of 
probable cause from the district judge); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179. 
 515. H.R. 8561. 
 516. H.R. 8914. 
 517. H.R. 12179. 
 518. S. 2177, 79th Cong. (1946) 62–71. 
 519. H.R. 8561; H.R. 8914; H.R. 12179. 
 520. See id. 
 521. H.R. 8914 § 6; H.R. 12179 § 6. 
 522. See U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60, at 35–36 (proposing alternative 
interpretations of the Congressional intent underlying the passage of the FTCA); 
MAMMEN, supra note 509, at 67 (qualifying the usefulness of pre-enactment legislative 
history when interpreting ambiguous statutory issues). 
 523. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1949) (citing 31  
U.S.C. § 223b (1946)). 
 524. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. 
United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
 525. Id. at 537–38 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 422 (1946)).   
 526. Id. at 538.   
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provided by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, as amended, 
or by the World War Veterans’ Act of 1924, as amended.’”527   
He argued that “[w]hat seems a conclusive reason for not reading 
into the act the exception suggested, however, is that this exception 
was originally contained in the tort claims act which was introduced 
into Congress . . . and was omitted, with apparent deliberation, when 
that bill was incorporated . . . [into] the Legislative Reorganization 
Act.”528  A year later, sitting on the Fourth Circuit’s unanimous 
Jefferson panel, Judge Parker declined to make that argument.529  
Rather, the Fourth Circuit stated that it was “in accord with the 
conclusions reached by the Second Circuit.”530  Its opinion concluded 
that Congress had not intended for the FTCA to allow every injury to 
a service member to become a potential negligence action because 
that would require the courts to review military decisions and would 
undermine military discipline.531  The court reasoned that “this 
consideration [was] too weighty to be swept aside by” the argument 
that Congress must have intended to allow such suits when it had not 
included a proposed exception for military claims in the final version 
of the FTCA.532  Judge Chesnut followed a similar path in the Jefferson 
district court litigation, acknowledging the potential strength of the 
missing exception argument in his first opinion,533 but holding 
against it in the second.534   
b. Feres & the Deterrence Role of Tort Law 
Feres is attacked on the ground that its bar to suit by service 
members for government negligence has removed the deterrence 
role that tort law normally serves.  Professor Turley argues largely 
from the perspective of financial deterrence535 while Major Brou 
argues for the deterrence of disclosure.536  
                                                      
 527. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 849 (4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing H.R. 181, 79th Cong. § 402(8) (1946)), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 528. Id.   
 529. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (“[T]oo much weight should not be given 
to the language contained in discarded measures . . . .”).   
 530. Id. at 519.   
 531. Id. at 520.   
 532. Id. 
 533. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. Md. 1947).   
 534. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).   
 535. See Turley, supra note 9, at 46–47 (relying upon the paradigm of the rational, 
self-interested, value-maximizing actor).   
 536. See Brou, supra note 447, at 33 (noting the increased judicial and public 
attention that FTCA claims impose on government organizations). 
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i. Financial Deterrence 
Professor Turley argues that the Feres bar immunizes the military 
from the financial costs of our tort system that normally encourage 
safe practices.  He states: 
 Feres constitutes a major reduction in potential costs for military 
businesses and activities.  For most businesses, liability costs 
(including insurance, risk abatement, and actual liability awards) 
represent a significant budget component. . . . Moreover, potential 
liability costs are a critical factor in businesses determining whether 
to enter a particular market or enterprise. For the military, such 
costs are present in a greatly reduced form.537 
 . . . . 
  With commonly tight budgetary conditions in the military, 
asymmetrical increases in the cost of individual units or programs 
will also be generally tracked. Even if such costs are borne in part 
by the Justice Department as the designated defense counsel for 
such claims, these costs will become part of an appropriation 
request and therefore subject to an oversight review in 
Congress. . . .  This could introduce personal costs for physicians in 
the form of increased insurance rates.538 
 . . . . 
 By introducing a liability system, the military will be forced to 
internalize more of the true costs of [its negligence].539 
 The argument that Feres undermines the financial deterrence role 
of tort law fails for two reasons.  First, as a general matter there is 
reason to believe that governments are not responsive to financial 
deterrence in the same way as private entities.  Second, federal 
agencies such as the Department of Defense are not responsive to 
financial deterrence because they have virtually no stake in the 
financial outcome of tort claims brought against the United States for 
their negligent acts. 
Professor Turley reasons that “there is little question that 
increasing levels of liability will influence the conduct of a rational 
actor.”540  There is, however, substantial question about how 
governments will respond to increased tort liability because 
governments and their agencies are not motivated by the single 
interest of maximizing monetary value.541  Because governments and 
                                                      
 537. Turley, supra note 9, at 49–50.  Professor Turley develops his Feres-Deterrence-
argument at length.  Id. at 46–67.  Accordingly, this summary of his argument is 
necessarily truncated. 
 538. Id. at 66.   
 539. Id. at 67.   
 540. Id. at 47.   
 541. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:  Markets, Politics, and the 
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agencies respond to political interests rather than financial ones, it is 
unlikely that requiring them to pay tort judgments will cause them to 
alter their practices or begin new loss prevention initiatives.542  This is 
particularly so if agencies perceive that compensation payments will 
not affect their budgets, either because payments are made from a 
general fund or because they expect that money paid from budgets 
will be restored in future appropriations.543  Agencies will also weigh 
the political cost of choosing loss prevention programs and enhanced 
safety over core agency functions and more politically-valued 
programs.544  Because agencies engage in such political balancing, 
“tort liability cannot be expected to promote efficient government 
investment in loss prevention.”545  When tort damages are paid out as 
a consequence of such choices, the agency can rationalize the 
payment as “a cost of public policy.”546  Accordingly, agencies are not 
responsive to financial deterrence. 
Financial deterrence is even less effective with federal agencies 
such as the Department of Defense.  Federal agencies in general are 
subject to the political issues discussed in the preceding paragraph.  
Because military officers will not expect to be in the same position 
three years hence, their political choices regarding the programs they 
direct may be even more skewed to favor core agency functions.547   
                                                      
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355–56 (2000) (concluding 
that one cannot simply assume “that government will behave like a private, profit-
maximizing firm”).   
 542. See Turley, supra note 9, at 48 (“[P]ast cases indicate high rates of malpractice 
and injuries have occurred within this [military] system without meaningful risk-
avoidance . . . .”);  Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 965 (2005) (“Government officials do not derive any intrinsic 
value from public funds . . . and therefore do not necessarily attach any disutility to 
losing it through compensation payments.”); Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of 
Governmental Damages Liability:  Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 797, 824–26 (2007) (summarizing the gradual erosion of the assumption 
that government tort liability works in the same manner as the common law liability 
of private tortfeasors).   
 543. Accord Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of 
the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 758 (2004) (examining similar incentive 
structures within the context of police departments); see Levinson, supra note 542, at 
966 (acknowledging that legislators who approve of an agency’s activities may simply 
replace any losses imposed by liability in the following appropriations cycle).  
 544. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 826 (“When the political cost of diverting 
public resources to loss prevention is sufficiently high, government will not make the 
investment even when it is economically justified.”).   
 545. Id.  For example, a social welfare agency must choose between providing 
more benefits directly to clients and maintaining its physical facilities and staff 
credentials.   
 546. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
1529, 1539 (1992). 
 547. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 664 (2008) (stipulating the length of duty 
assignments); DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1300.19, DOD JOINT OFFICER 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 3 (2010) (evidencing DOD policy that tour lengths not 
exceed three years per tour).    
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Federal agencies have very little stake in the financial outcome of 
tort litigation that arises from their negligence.548  Agencies do not 
pay FTCA settlements in excess of $2,500 or FTCA judgments.549  
Those settlements and judgments are paid from the Judgment Fund 
rather than agency appropriations.550  Because the Judgment Fund is 
a permanent, indefinite appropriation,551 any FTCA judgment or 
settlement is paid automatically and without any Congressional 
oversight review.552  Because the FTCA grants immunity to federal 
employees for any tort cognizable under the Act,553 those employees 
do not suffer financial consequences for their negligence nor do they 
need liability insurance.554  For all these reasons, if Feres did not exist, 
the Department of Defense would be no more responsive to financial 
deterrence than it is with Feres. 
ii. Deterrence of Disclosure 
Major Brou argues that the Feres Court, in focusing on the 
compensation aspect of the benefits provided to injured service 
members, ignored the preventative function provided by tort law.  In 
arguing that FTCA claims have the potential to hone judicial and 
public attention on the shortcomings of governmental organizations, 
Major Brou maintains that the Feres doctrine undermines the 
government’s incentive to improve efficiency and safety by allowing it 
                                                      
 548. See Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 477, at 15 (“[T]he FTCA message 
to correct negligent behavior is somewhat muted since the FTCA holds the 
Government, not the individual, liable”).  But see id. (acknowledging that federal 
agencies do bear the cost of providing litigation support, witnesses, and in-house 
counsel to assist the Department of Justice attorneys that represent the government 
in court).   
 549. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006); 3 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. 
COUNSEL, GAO-08-078SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–30 to –44 
(3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES, 3d. ed.], available at  
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf.  The rare exceptions include 
nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, id. at 15–266, and the U.S. Postal Service, 3 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, GAO/OGC-94-33, 
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–34 to –37 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES, 2d. ed.], available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og94033.pdf.  
 550. See 31 U.S.C. §1304 (2006); PRINCIPLES, 3d. ed., supra note 549, at 14–19 to  
–49. 
 551. See H.R. REP NO. 84-2638, at 72 (1957) (noting that H.R. 12138, 84th Cong.  
§ 1302 “establish[es] a permanent indefinite appropriation for the payment of 
judgments”).   
 552. PRINCIPLES, 2d. ed., supra note 549, at 14-5 to -15; JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra 
note 35, § 3.03. 
 553. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). 
 554. Government health care professionals stand in a different posture because, 
although they are immune from paying damages, adverse judgments arising from 
their care are reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. See 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 11131–37 (2006).  See generally Hornbrook & Kirschbaum supra note 477, at 15 
n.104. 
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to avoid liability for injuries inflicted upon service members by 
government negligence.555 
This argument ignores the non-tort factors that already bring about 
disclosure, overestimates the likely effect of disclosures that might 
arise from tort litigation, and disregards the current exposure of 
military agencies to tort litigation arising from care provided to 
civilians.  There are more effective ways to bring about broad public 
disclosure than tort litigation, including a vigorous political system 
and a free press.556  Most tort cases (as opposed to their underlying 
events) do not lead to widespread media coverage.557  To the extent 
that tort litigation has a deterrence of disclosure, the military medical 
system is already fruitful ground for its work because a majority of its 
patients are not service members to whom Feres applies.558  Therefore, 
doing away with Feres would bring about only an incremental increase 
in the deterrence of disclosure. 
3. Characterizations of Feres 
a. Feres as “Judicially Created” 
In Feres, the Court explained:  “We do not think that Congress, in 
drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local 
law for service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.”559  
Thus, on its face, Feres is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Congressional intent, rather than a judicial promulgation of a new 
exception to the FTCA.  Over the last three decades, this point has 
been clouded by a number of circuit court opinions that casually 
characterize the Feres doctrine as a “judicially created exception” to 
the FTCA.560  The opinions support this characterization by reference 
to the statute,561 to Feres itself,562 or to nothing at all.563   
                                                      
 555. Brou, supra note 449, at 33; see also Turley, supra note 9, at 47–49 (discussing 
non-liability mechanisms that can influence agency risk prevention). 
 556. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 828–29 (rejecting the suggestion that tort 
litigation will “unearth[] governmental misconduct”); Turley, supra note 9, at 47 
(noting good faith military response to political pressure about medical 
malpractice).  But see Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:  The 
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859–62 (2001) 
(exploring the informational and fault-fixing features of municipal liability suits).  
 557. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 828–29. 
 558. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., EVALUATION OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM:  FISCAL YEAR 
2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (2010) (reporting that Active Duty military personnel 
constituted fourteen percent of beneficiaries eligible for DoD health care benefits at 
the end of fiscal year 2009, and Guard and Reserve military personnel constituted 
four percent; the remaining eighty-two percent are active duty family members, 
guard and reserve family members, and retirees and family members). 
 559. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
 560. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th 
Cir. 2007); Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[The FTCA 
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The notion that Feres is a “judicially created FTCA exception” was 
mentioned in only one judicial opinion in the first twenty-three years 
after the decision.564  From 1973 to 1977, just three opinions used the 
“judicially created” characterization, but none provided authority or 
explanation for the term.565  In a similar fashion, and with a similar 
lack of authority or explanation, Justice Marshall used the phrase in 
his 1977 Stencel dissent, stating, “I cannot agree that that narrow, 
judicially created exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity 
contained in the Act should be extended to any category of litigation 
other than suits against the Government by active-duty servicemen 
based on injuries incurred while on duty.”566 
 Legal scholarship was similarly silent.  Only one academic 
article published in the 1950s suggested that Feres judicially created a 
new exception to the FTCA.567  In the 1960s, only one student article 
made such a characterization.568  In the 1980s, it appeared in several 
student works569 and a handful of works by scholars.570  As in the 
                                                      
is] subject to a judicially-created exception carved out in Feres v. United States . . . .”); 
Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Miller v. 
United States, 42 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995); Romero ex rel. Romero v. United 
States, 954 F.2d 223, 224 (4th Cir. 1992); Chatman v. Hernandez, 805 F.2d 453, 457 
(1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 364–65 (8th Cir. 
1984); see also Hata v. United States, 23 F.3d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the 
Feres doctrine as a “judicially created ‘incident to service’ exception to the [FTCA]”). 
 561. Hata, 23 F.3d at 234 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994)). 
 562. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1341; Brown, 462 F.3d at 611; Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1223; 
Romero, 954 F.2d at 224; Chatman, 805 F.2d at 457; cf. Brown, 739 F.2d at 365 (citing 
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Feres, 340 U.S. 135; Brooks v. United 
States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 563. Miller, 42 F.3d at 300. 
 564. Mattos v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 38, 38 (E.D. Cal. 1967) (addressing the 
contention that “no recovery may be had as against the United States because of 
judicially-created exception to the [FTCA] . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 565. Hass ex rel. United States v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1143 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(citing only Feres); Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(same); Frazier v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 208, 208–09 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (same). 
 566. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 567. See Robert A. Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 
RUTGERS L. REV. 316, 316 (1954) (“In Feres . . . [t]he Court in effect added an 
exception to the act which discriminated against certain servicemen.”). 
 568. Recent Development, Negligently Conducted Pre-Induction Physical Examination 
Not Actionable Under Federal Tort Claims Act when Injury Occurs During Service, 62 COLUM. 
L. REV. 381, 381–82 (1962) (characterizing the Feres doctrine as an exception 
“created by judicial decision”). 
 569. See, e.g., John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson:  Feres Doctrine Gets New 
Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 185 (1988) (“The source of the 
injustice is the Feres doctrine, the only judicially-created exception to the [FTCA].” 
(citing Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–22, 60 Stat. 842 (1946); 
Feres v. United States 340 U.S. 135 (1950))); Brian P. Cain, Note, Military Medical 
Malpractice and the Feres Doctrine, 20 GA. L. REV. 497, 498 (1986); J. Thomas Morina, 
Note, Denial of Atomic Veterans’ Tort Claims:  The Enduring Fallout from Feres v. United 
States, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 260 (1983); Lora Tredway, Comment, When a 
Veteran “Wants” Uncle Sam:  Theories of Recovery for Servicemembers Exposed to Hazardous 
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judicial opinions, the characterization was either baldly stated or 
supported only by a reference to the FTCA or the Feres opinion.571  
By the 1990s, the notion that the Feres decision had “judicially 
created” a new exception to the FTCA had become a shibboleth, 
widely repeated, generally accepted, and largely unexamined.572  The 
falsity of that notion is suggested by the fact that it was barely 
murmured in the two decades immediately following the decision.  
The falsity is demonstrated by an examination of how the Feres Court 
came to its decision.573 
b. Feres as “Usurpation” 
Some of the most distinguished critics of the Feres opinion go 
further than repeating the vaguely judgmental, “judicially created” 
allegation.  They accuse the Court of intentionally usurping the role 
of Congress.  Professor Turley argues: 
[T]he actions of the Court in creating the Feres doctrine go far 
beyond other areas in usurping legislative prerogatives.  The Court 
essentially created a civil liability system to its own liking, based on 
its own uninformed assumptions.  The Court’s unilateral action not 
only conflicts with the language of the FTCA but engages in a level 
of judicial legislation that may be unprecedented in its scope and 
impact.  At a minimum, Feres represented a total departure from 
principles of judicial restraint and deference to the political 
branches.574 
                                                      
Substances, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 1095, 1112 (1982). 
 570. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1086 n.337 (1989) (explaining that the Supreme Court used a broad 
application of a “judicially created exception to FTCA”); Courtney W. Howland, The 
Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 93, 102 (1985); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:  Lessons of the 
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1336 n.377 (1988); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and 
Federalism:  The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 105 n.198 (1988) 
(describing the “judicially created Feres doctrine” as peculiar); see also Jeffrey R. 
Simmons, Military Medical Malpractice, 23 ARIZ. B.J. 22, 24 (1988) (explaining that the 
Court “judicially created an exception in . . . Feres”). 
 571. See supra notes 569–70. 
 572. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 444 (1999) (“[T]he judiciary has created an additional, major 
exception . . . known as the Feres doctrine.”); Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 
477, at 18 (1990); see also Norman W. Black, Recent Developments in Admiralty Law in the 
United States Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
327, 353 (1997) (citing Miller v. United States, 42 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995)); 
Koh, supra note 570, at 1336 n.377 (citing United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Peggy L. Miller, An Ounce of Immunity Prevents a Pound 
of Lawsuits:  Medical Malpractice and Military Mothers, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 327, 332 
(1993) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. 135); Sisk, supra note 444, at 287; Wolfson, supra note 
570, at 105 n.198 (citing Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Feres, 340 
U.S. at 143–44). 
 573. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 574. Turley, supra note 9, at 68 (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 
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This is a very strong accusation. 
The Feres opinion explicitly states that the Court’s goal was to figure 
out, as best it could, what Congress had intended when it passed the 
FTCA.575  The task was difficult because nothing in the FTCA’s 
legislative history addressed the question whether the Act 
encompassed claims arising from military service.576  The usurpation 
theory requires disbelief of the Court’s statements that it was engaged 
in good faith legislative interpretation.  But there is no basis for 
concluding that the Court was disingenuous. 
The Feres decision does not conflict with the language of the FTCA.  
The argument that it does conflict is based on the assertion that the 
combatant activity exception of § 2680(j) is the only provision that 
limits service members’ rights under the FTCA.577  While the 
exceptions set out in § 2680 are important limitations on the FTCA’s 
                                                      
303 (1976) (per curiam); Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).  Judge Ferguson stated:   
When considering the Feres doctrine, however, we are not dealing with a 
legislative action, but rather with a judicial re-writing of an unambiguous and 
constitutional statute. . . .  Feres presented neither ambiguity nor 
constitutional violation nor legislative silence. . . . [T]he Court simply did 
not agree with Congress and searched in puzzling ways to declare that 
military personnel are not equal to civilians.  
Costo, 248 F.3d at 871, 873. 
 575. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 (“The only issue of law raised is whether the Tort 
Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‘incident to the service’ what under 
other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.”); id. (“Under these 
circumstances [the absence of any legislative history], no conclusion can be above 
challenge, but if we misinterpret the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready 
remedy.”); id. at 146 (“We do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a 
new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries or death 
due to negligence.”).  
 576. Id. at 138 (“No committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the 
statute was designed to have on the problem before us, or that it even was in mind.”). 
 577. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 9, at 8 (asserting that Congress only expressly 
exempted FTCA claims that arose out of “combatant activities of the military . . . [in 
a] time of war,” noting that the “choice of wording by Congress is telling”); see also 
Costo, 248 F.3d at 871–73 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  Judge Ferguson argued: 
Feres took [the combatant activity exception, § 2680(j),] a fairly small, clearly 
defined, legislatively-created classification and broadened it considerably. . . .  
We can speculate forever upon reasons why Feres refused to apply a law 
written by Congress.  It is clear that Feres recognized that the direct and 
unambiguous command of Congress created liability for claims caused by 
members of the military or naval forces of the United States, Feres, 340 U.S. at 
138; 28 U.S.C. § 2671, and that the direct and unambiguous command of 
Congress exempted only claims arising out of combatant activities during 
time of war, Feres, 340 U.S. at 138; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).   
Costo, 248 F.3d at 872–73 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  This is mistaken on both 
accounts.  The Court did not derive Feres from the combatant activity exception.  The 
Feres opinion mentions the exception only once, and only in the context of discussing 
several rejected “considerations persuasive of liability.”  340 U.S. at 138.  Nor did the 
Court recognize that the exception created a “direct and unambiguous command.”  
To the contrary, the Court considered this argument and rejected it.  See id. 
(identifying the argument that “from [the combatant activity exception] it is said we 
should infer allowance of claims arising from non-combat activities in peace”). 
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waiver of sovereign immunity, the jurisdictional limits of § 1346(b) 
are an equally important part of the law and must also be met.578  
Accordingly, the combatant activity exception of § 2680(j) is not the 
only FTCA provision that might bar claims of service members.579   
The usurpation theory is baseless.  There is simply no evidence that 
nine justices chose to “create[] a civil liability system to [their] own 
liking”580 and disregarded a “direct and unambiguous command”581 of 
Congress.  The historical backdrop to Feres fully supports the Court’s 
conclusion that Congress did not contemplate that the FTCA would 
allow incident-to-service suits by service members.  This background 
includes the long legislative build-up to the enactment of the FTCA, 
the detailed, compensation system Congress created for service 
members, coupled with the lack of Congressional direction about 
how that compensation would be reconciled with FTCA judgments, 
the significant pre-FTCA body of law barring suits related to military 
service, and the absence of private laws enacted for service members. 
The strongest reason to reject the usurpation theory is the evident 
good faith of the justices who dealt with the incident-to-service issue.  
Feres was decided without dissent.582  Of those nine justices, five had 
voted in favor of the Brooks holding that service members could sue 
under the FTCA for injuries not incident-to-service.583  The fact that a 
majority of the justices voted against the government in Brooks and for 
the government in Feres is strong confirmation that they were 
forthright in their approach to ascertaining what Congress had 
intended, as opposed to pushing some pro-military agenda. 
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit followed a similar path.  
Judge Parker had dissented from the Fourth Circuit opinion in 
Brooks, which held that the FTCA did not allow any suits by service 
members.584  His dissent foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s Brooks 
opinion, which reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that suits could 
be brought for injuries to service members that were not incident to 
                                                      
 578. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (explaining that Section 1346(b) 
grants jurisdiction for certain claims against the United States, and noting that each 
element of the jurisdictional grant must be met; supra notes 459–63 and 
accompanying text). 
 579. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (rejecting an FTCA claim on the grounds that it 
failed to present a cognizable claim to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement).   
 580. See Turley, supra note 9, at 68. 
 581. Costo, 248 F.3d at 873 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).   
 582. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135. 
 583. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1949).  Justices Frankfurter 
and Douglas dissented.  Id.  Justice Clark joined the Court on August 19, 1949.  
Justice Minton joined on October 12, 1949. 
 584. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, J., 
dissenting), rev’d 337 U.S. 49 (1949).   
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military service.585  Judge Parker was also on the unanimous Fourth 
Circuit panel in Jefferson that held the FTCA did not authorize claims 
for injuries that arose incident-to-service because “it [was] not 
reasonable to suppose, in the absence of an express declaration on 
the point, that Congress intended” to allow such claims.586  
U.S. District Judge William Chesnut showed similar care and 
intellectual honesty.  When first confronted with the incident-to-
service issue in Jefferson, he denied the government’s motion to 
dismiss without prejudice.587  Following a trial on the merits, he re-
examined the motion and granted it, concluding that such claims 
“were not within the contemplation of Congress in enacting this 
particular legislation.”588   
The usurpation theory is refuted by the language of Justice 
Jackson’s opinion, the lack of evidence that the Court was 
disingenuous in stating its legislative interpretation goal, and the 
justices’ demonstrated willingness to reject the government’s strong 
arguments and find liability in Brooks.  It is also contradicted by the 
richness of thought and due care of the judges who dealt with the 
incident-to-service issue in the courts below.  A careful reading of the 
decisions in Brooks, Jefferson, Griggs, and Feres, and the Supreme Court 
briefs in those cases, negates any suggestion that the Court sought to 
ignore Congress and impose its own will.   
c. Feres as “Unfair” 
The Feres opinion has repeatedly been characterized as unfair.  
Justice Scalia condemned “our clearly wrong decision in Feres and . . . 
the unfairness and irrationality that decision has bred.”589  It is said 
that “[t]he injustice of the doctrine is patently obvious and very well 
known,”590 and that “[f]ailure to repeal the Feres Doctrine has allowed 
                                                      
 585. The Supreme Court stated in its Brooks opinion, “We agree with Judge 
Parker.”  Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51.  It then adopted much of his analysis.  Compare Brooks, 
337 U.S. at 51–54, with Brooks, 169 F.2d at 846–50. 
 586. See Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 587. See Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. 209, 216 (D. Md. 1947). 
 588. See Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).   
 589. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 590. Barry, supra note 8, at 121; accord Johnson, 481 U.S. at 701 n.* (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (listing cases and law review articles critical of Feres); see also Dana Michael 
Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One:  Four Proposals to Combat Sexual Harassment in 
Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 192 (2007) (describing the argument that 
Feres has engendered “unfairness and irrationality” as “most compelling”); Miller, 
supra note 572, at 336 (explaining the unfairness imposed by a service member’s 
inability to choose a place of residence working in tandem with the Feres doctrine to 
prevent the choice of state tort law). 
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service members unfairly to be treated differently from other persons, 
and denied compensation for injuries suffered.”591  
The perception of unfairness seems to have two sources.  The first 
is public perception itself.  The “judicially created” shibboleth is not 
much questioned because it is so often repeated.592  The same may be 
true for the “unfairness” label.593  The second source begins from the 
premise that service members should be able to sue the government 
in the same way that others can, and concludes it is unfair that  
they cannot.594  That premise ignores the distinctive relationship  
service members have with the government.595  It also glosses over  
the workers’ compensation-like trade of accepting assured, 
administrative, no-fault compensation in exchange for forgoing the 
opportunity to bring suit in tort and recover more damages.596  The 
real consequence of Feres is that, for purposes of suing their employer 
in tort, the government’s military employees are treated in roughly 
the same fashion as employees of other employers.597  This is hardly 
unfair.598 
CONCLUSION 
To discuss the consequences of the Feres decision it may be helpful 
to return to first principles.  A sovereign state can be sued only to the 
extent that it has consented to be sued and only its legislative branch 
can give such consent.599  Absent an applicable waiver of sovereign 
immunity, the United States cannot be sued for damages.600  Any such 
                                                      
 591. A.B.A. & B. ASS’N OF D.C., supra note 7, at 19.   
 592. See supra Part IV.B.3.a. 
 593. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 8, at 121 (stating, without citation, that “[t]he 
injustice of the doctrine is patently obvious and very well known”). 
 594. See, e.g., supra notes 590–91. 
 595. See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 596. See Michael L. Richmond, Protecting the Power Brokers:  Of Feres, Immunity, and 
Privilege, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623, 644–47 (1988) (exploring the notion that the 
compensation rationale of Feres is analogous to a workers’ compensation scheme in 
justifying the disallowance of FTCA claims).    
 597. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 5A.05; supra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 598. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, § 5A.05 (“[T]here appears to be 
little validity to the view that it is a harsh and inequitable doctrine that Congress 
simply could not have intended to impose on servicemen.”); Joan M. Bernott, 
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69–70 (1987) (“Servicemen already enjoy greater access to federal relief for most 
injury than do all other federal employees; equity does not compel exacerbating this 
disparity by revoking or limiting Feres.”); supra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 599. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (observing that the 
power to consent to suits and waive sovereign immunity is “reserved to Congress”); 
United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (explaining that 
without the consent of the sovereign, the “attempted exercise of judicial power is 
void”). 
 600. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United 
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). 
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waiver “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . and will 
not be implied.”601  Congress created such a waiver when it passed the 
Federal Tort Claims Act.   
The issue in Feres was direct and specific:  “[W]hether the Tort 
Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‘incident to the 
service’ what under other circumstances would be an actionable 
wrong.”602  This is an all or nothing proposition—either Congress 
provided the necessary waiver for incident-to-service suits or it did 
not.  The Court held that Congress had not intended the FTCA to 
encompass claims arising out of activity incident to military service.603  
Accordingly, because the FTCA does not provide an applicable 
waiver, incident-to-service claims are barred by sovereign immunity.604  
Three consequences logically follow from Feres’ holding that 
Congressional enactment of the FTCA does not waive sovereign 
immunity for incident-to-service claims.  First, the decision is directly 
applicable only to the FTCA.  Feres is only persuasive authority for 
other statutes and areas of law.  In explaining its holding, the Feres 
Court discussed a number of rationales or factors that supported its 
conclusion that Congress had not included incident-to-service claims 
in the FTCA.  These rationales include the absence of any 
comparable private person liability,605 the distinctively federal 
relationship between service members and the United States,606 the 
inappropriateness of using varying state laws to govern that 
relationship,607 and finally, the compensation system Congress 
established for military personnel and the absence of any direction 
from Congress as to how moneys from the two remedies would be 
adjusted.608  Because they proved useful, these rationales were 
adopted as reasons counseling hesitation in recognizing 
constitutional tort remedies for injuries that arise out of or in the 
course of activity incident to military service.609  They were also found 
useful in determining whether the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Death 
on the High Seas Act, or the Public Vessels Act waive sovereign 
                                                      
 601. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., 
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 
(1990)). 
 602. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
 603. See id. at 146. 
 604. See id.; supra notes 599–603. 
 605. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42. 
 606. See id. at 143–44. 
 607. See id. at 142–43 (noting that soldiers serve in a “number of places in quick 
succession,” making the use of geography to determine the selection of law for their 
tort claims an imprudent choice). 
 608. See id. at 144. 
 609. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987) (quoting Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).  
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immunity for incident-to-service injuries.610  With regard to the Privacy 
Act, they correctly were not.611   
The second consequence is that the rationales supporting the 
Court’s analysis in Feres are not elements of a defense.612  They are, 
taken together, an explanation for the Feres conclusion that Congress 
did not contemplate that the FTCA would provide a tort remedy for 
incident-to-service claims.  But debating whether a particular inquiry 
will disrupt military discipline or whether a government contractor is 
entitled to compensation does not change the core holding—
Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for tort suits by service 
members related to military service.613 
The third consequence of Feres’ holding is simple.  Because the 
Court held that the FTCA is not a waiver of sovereign immunity for 
incident-to-service claims, federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, lack the authority to modify Feres because they do not have the 
authority to waive sovereign immunity.614  The Court does have 
authority to decide that it had been mistaken in Feres about what 
Congress intended and to overturn the entire doctrine, but 
successfully and credibly revisiting and reversing such a legislative 
interpretation sixty years after the fact would be extremely difficult.  
Certainly Congress can undo Feres, as the Court has repeatedly 
recognized.615  Whether it should do so is a matter that might be 
debated.  While that argument is beyond the scope of this article, a 
thorough understanding of the historical and legal backdrop to the 
FTCA and the Feres decision would elevate such a debate above the 
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generalities and blind assumptions that have too frequently been 
lodged against Feres in the past. 
 
